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ABSTRACT
Huntington's disease (HD) is a genetic, neurodegenerative disorder that is characterized
by motor, cognitive and psychiatric disturbances. Anosognosia, or lack of awareness of
symptoms, is commonly observed in neurodegenerative disorders, including HD. Most theories
suggest that emotion, executive functioning, and memory play important roles in self-awareness.
There is limited research of anosognosia in HD and no theoretical model of how it manifests in
the disease. The purpose of this study was to examine Metacognitive Knowledge, or overall
beliefs about the self, and Online Awareness, or the ability to predict (Anticipatory Awareness)
and evaluate (Emergent Awareness) task performance, in HD. Fifty-six symptomatic HD
patients and fifty informants completed the study. Results revealed that those with the best
executive functioning and lowest apathy were also better able to report on their symptoms. Those
with the best executive functioning and memory and lowest apathy were the best at predicting
and evaluating their performance on cognitive tasks. Patient self-report of memory was
associated with cognitive performance while self-report of executive functioning and apathy was
not. Only informant report of apathy and executive functioning was related to cognitive
performance. For both Metacognitive Knowledge and Online Awareness, HD patients tended to
have a better awareness of memory than executive functioning. These results suggest that
awareness in HD is governed by local monitoring systems rather than a single metacognitive
mechanism. It is also consistent with literature that suggests that individuals are least able to
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evaluate performance on tasks for which they are poorest in skill level, as HD patients tend to
have impaired executive functioning and increased apathy with relative sparing of memory.
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CHAPTER ONE:
INTRODUCTION
Huntington’s Disease
Huntington’s disease (HD) is an autosomal dominant neurodegenerative disease that is
characterized by motor, cognitive, affective, and behavioral disturbances (Novak & Tabrizi,
2010). The incidence rate of the disease has been estimated to be 0.38 per 100,000 per year, with
lower incidence rates in Asia compared to Europe, North America, and Australia. Worldwide
prevalence has been estimated at 2.71 per 100,000 (Pringsheim et al., 2012). HD is caused by an
abnormal cytosine-adenine-guanine (CAG) trinucleotide repeat expansion of the huntingtin gene
on chromosome 4 resulting in the production of abnormal huntingtin protein. The function of this
protein in healthy individuals is unknown (MacDonald et al., 1993; Paulsen, 2011; Walker,
2007). Individuals who have a CAG repeat length of 39 or more are considered to be gene
positive and will develop Huntington’s disease during a normal human lifespan (Walker, 2007).
While evidence suggests that CAG repeat length may influence when motor symptoms manifest,
repeat length is often not associated with the nature of disease progression within individuals
(Kieburtz et al., 1994; Lee et al., 2012; Rosenblatt et al., 2012). Currently, HD is diagnosed when
there is either a positive genetic test or a family history of HD in addition to unequivocal
extrapyramidal motor signs (Paulsen, 2011). Patients who have tested positive for the CAG
repeat expansion but have yet to develop motor symptoms are considered to be in the prodromal
stage of the disease (Pringsheim et al., 2012). Current classifications of disease onset do not take
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into account that psychiatric and behavioral disturbance and cognitive impairment are often
observed long before motor symptoms are expressed (Bonelli & Cummings, 2008; Duff,
Paulsen, Beglinger, Langbehn, & Stout, 2007; Paulsen, 2011; Thompson, Snowden, Craufurd, &
Neary, 2002). Both cognitive and emotional symptoms have been found to be associated with
functional capacity independent of motor symptoms, disease duration, and demographic
information (Nehl, Paulsen, & Huntington Study Group, 2004).
Often classified as a subcortical neurodegenerative disease, HD pathology results in
reduced gray matter volume, beginning in the striatum (i.e. putamen and caudate) followed by
the cerebral cortex (Novak & Tabrizi, 2010; Tabrizi et al., 2009). Striatal volume is reduced as
many as twenty years prior to the onset of motor symptoms (Aylward et al., 2004). Reduced
striatal volume impacts frontal-subcortical circuits, which connect subcortical regions to the
limbic system and frontal lobes (Bonelli & Cummings, 2008). When these circuits are disrupted,
symptoms associated with damage to the prefrontal cortex, such as executive dysfunction and
apathy, are commonly observed (Unschuld et al., 2013; Van Duijn, Reedeker, Giltay, Roos, &
Van der Mast, 2010). This has been demonstrated in a study that suggested HD patients have
decreased connectivity between the anterior cingulate cortex and lateral prefrontal cortex when
performing tasks of inhibition (Thiruvady et al., 2007). Furthermore, in early stages of the
disease, cerebral white matter volume is also reduced, which is associated with poorer
performance on tasks of processing speed and inhibition (Beglinger et al., 2005).
Studies have also suggested that anosognosia, or unawareness of deficits, may develop
with the progression of HD. Patients have been shown to have decreased awareness of several
domains, including executive functioning, behavioral and emotional control, and activities of
daily living (Chatterjee, Anderson, Moskowitz, Hauser, & Marder, 2005; Ho, Robbins, &
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Barker, 2006; Hoth et al., 2007). While several studies have examined anosognosia in HD,
mechanisms that are associated with anosognosia in HD are still unknown. Though no imaging
studies have been conducted to date, observed unawareness may be due to disruptions in frontalsubcortical circuits (McCusker & Loy, 2014; Sitek, Thompson, Craufurd, & Snowden, 2014). It
is important to gain a better understanding of anosognosia in this population because
unawareness may have a significant impact on patient care and safety (McCusker & Loy, 2014).

Metacognition and Anosognosia
Anosognosia is a multifaceted construct that refers to a lack of awareness or recognition
of illness or deficits. Babinski was the first to introduce the term “anosognosia,” referring to a
lack of awareness of motor deficits observed in patients with hemiplegia (Prigatano, 2010).
Anosognosia can impact some functional domains and not others and manifests in neurologic
disorders, including HD (Jenkinson & Fotopoulou, 2014; Landes, Sperry, Strauss, &
Geldmacher, 2001; McCusker & Loy, 2014; Nurmi & Jehkonen, 2014; Prigatano, 2010; Sitek et
al., 2014).
Models of general self-awareness suggest that the construct of the self is supported by
different brain functions and processes and different knowledge bases (Boyer, Robbins, & Jack,
2005). Gallagher distinguished between the minimal self, which involves the sense of ownership
of one’s own body and the narrative self, which involves social identity, autobiographical
memory, and continuity over time. He also described the concept of agency as being the sense of
ownership of one’s actions or thoughts and the understanding that the self is the one undergoing
an experience (Gallagher, 2000). Some suggest that autobiographical memory, comprised of
episodic memory and semantic information about one’s own past is essential in the development
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of one’s sense of self. Memory allows for the ability to compare current experiences to past
experiences and to support the idea that the self is durable over time and separate from other
individuals (Boyer et al., 2005; Conway, 2005; Morris & Mograbi, 2013). Additionally, theory
of mind and empathy appear to be important for supporting the idea that the self is distinct from
other individuals (Boyer et al., 2005).

Models of Anosognosia
Theoretical models of anosognosia provide a framework for asking questions and
providing a basis for determining methods of measurement to enhance construct validity of
studies (Jenkinson & Fotopoulou, 2014; Prigatano & Johnson, 2003). One of the challenges in
studying anosognosia is that there is currently no theoretical model of anosognosia that is
universally accepted (Prigatano, 2010). Some of the more studied models are described below.

Hierarchical Models
Stuss and Alexander (2000) postulate a hierarchical model of awareness that includes
four levels of awareness in the following order: arousal-attention, perceptual-motor, executive
mediation, and self-awareness. There are bidirectional relationships between each level. The two
highest levels, executive mediation, and self-awareness are associated with prefrontal cortex
functioning. They argue that the highest level of the hierarchy, self-awareness, is the result of
the convergence of mood states and memory of abstract states, which allows for expectancy for
the future.
Similarly, The Prigatano and Johnson (2003) model suggests that there are three vectors
of consciousness that are arranged in a hierarchical manner: 1) wakefulness, 2) the sense of being
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aware of the self, and 3) theory of mind. They suggested that the three vectors interact, involve
overlapping neural circuits, and evolve over time to allow for the survival of the person.
Additionally, they suggest that heteromodal cortex is important for the development of vectors
two and three. Heteromodal cortex refers to brain regions that receive input from multiple
sensory or multimodal areas and allow for the integration of information from multiple sensory
modalities. Heteromodal cortex is associated with higher order levels of functioning because of
integration of several cognitive functions (Blumenfeld, 2002; Donnelly, 2011). Many studies
across patient populations support the theory that there is a relationship between the heteromodal
cortex (i.e. prefrontal lobe, inferior parietal lobe, angular gyrus, supramarginal gyrus, and the
anterior tips of the temporal lobe), unawareness, and theory of mind (Adenzato, Cavallo, &
Enrici, 2010; Decety & Sommerville, 2003; Keenan, Nelson, O'Connor, & Pascual-Leone, 2001;
Keenan, Wheeler, Gallup, & Pascual-Leone, 2000; Rosen, 2011; Toglia & Kirk, 2000).
Clare and colleagues recently proposed another hierarchical model of awareness. From
lowest to highest, the levels of awareness include sensory registration, performance monitoring,
evaluative judgment, and meta-representation. Similar to the Stuss and Alexander (2000), this
model suggests that performance monitoring may also be influenced by beliefs and expectations,
task knowledge, feedback, and emotion. Evaluative judgment reflects the general awareness of
abilities, such as understanding one’s own overall memory functioning or driving ability. They
suggested that evaluative judgment is separate from performance monitoring in that a patient
may be able to identify task-specific errors but may still maintain he or she has no difficulty in
that cognitive domain, such as memory. Similar to Prigatano and Johnson’s (2003) concept of
theory of mind, meta-representation involves self-reflection and the ability to consider others’
perspectives. This includes being aware of having a specific diagnosis and awareness of the
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impact of symptoms on his or herself (e.g. everyday activities) or others. The individual’s
knowledge and experience, emotions and attitudes, cultural perspectives, and self-reflection
influence meta-representation (Clare, Marková, Roth, & Morris, 2011).

Dynamic Model
Rosen (2011) suggested that awareness is not necessarily hierarchical and that each
success or failure in task performance leads to changes in self-appraisal. Like many of the other
models, this theory argues the importance of considering memory and executive functioning in a
model of unawareness, as both are important in self-appraisal. When a person completes a task,
there is an activation of performance monitoring systems that compare performance with task
demands. When a discrepancy is detected, emotional modulators mark the event with a level of
importance and allow for the event to be evaluated. This information is then stored in long-term
memory and may be used to update beliefs of one’s own abilities. Rosen emphasized the
importance of the emotional component of his model. He suggested that motivation may impact
the level of monitoring and may also enhance monitoring through the impact of failed tasks.
Overall, most models of awareness are in agreement that several brain processes and
regions are involved in the development of self-awareness. Hierarchical models of awareness
suggest that lower cognitive functions feed into higher cognitive functions to develop awareness.
In dynamic models, different processes interact to develop awareness. In both hierarchical and
dynamic models, executive functioning, emotion, and memory are suggested to be important
processes involved in awareness. Another model called the Cognitive Awareness Model (CAM)
provides an in-depth framework for understanding how these processes interact to influence selfawareness in neurodegenerative diseases. This model is described in detail below. Also described
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below in detail, is the Toglia and Kirk Model (2000), as it provides a framework for examining
general awareness and awareness within the context of a task. Taken together, these two models
may help provide guidance to better our understanding of anosognosia in HD.

Cognitive Awareness Model (CAM)
Like other models, the CAM model also acknowledges that anosognosia is multifaceted
and can result from different lesions of the brain (Agnew & Morris, 1998; Hannesdottir &
Morris, 2007; Mograbi & Morris, 2014; Morris & Mograbi, 2013). This model originated from
Schacter’s Dissociable Interactions and Conscious Experience Model (DICE) in which he
proposed an overarching mechanism of conscious awareness that interacts with other cognitive
systems, such as memory (FitzGerald, Carton, O'Keeffe, Coen, & Dockree, 2012; Schacter,
1990). Agnew and Morris (1998) extended the DICE model to explain anosognosia in dementia
populations. The model suggested that unawareness occurs when there is a failure to update
semantic memory about the self in the “Conscious Awareness Mechanism.” A core component
of awareness is the Personal Database (PDB), which consists of semantic representations of
conceptual knowledge, including information about one’s own abilities. The PDB changes over
the lifetime and is influenced by activities and personal experiences. The PDB serves as a
reference to make evaluative judgments of the self. The model also identifies a central Cognitive
Comparator Mechanism (CCM) that is under executive control. The purpose of the CCM is to
compare incoming information to the PDB. If there is a discrepancy, information is sent to the
Metacognitive Awareness System, which brings the failure to conscious awareness. Issues with
the CCM may lead to non-domain specific anosognosia. Unawareness may be due to a failure to
encode information (“mnemonic anosognosia”) or a failure to recognize a mismatch between
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previously known information about the self and new incoming information because of a
problem with the comparator mechanism (“executive anosognosia”). This suggests that
executive dysfunction and memory may have separate contributions to awareness. For example,
a study demonstrated that unawareness was associated with executive functioning but not
memory performance in cerebral small vessel disease patients. Unawareness was associated with
memory functioning in AD, however, and the relationship between executive functioning and
awareness was only trending (Brookes, Hannesdottir, Markus, & Morris, 2013). The model also
incorporates the impact of motivation and emotion. The theory suggests that when apathy is
present, the lack of emotion or motivation results in the failure of stimuli and events to receive
attention. This leads to reduced error monitoring and as a result, errors and consequences are
ignored. Additionally, depression may lead to more awareness because it may lead to negative
biases when judging self-ability, which may impact biased recall of negative information
(Mograbi & Morris, 2014; Morris & Mograbi, 2013).

Toglia and Kirk’s Model (2000)
Toglia and Kirk’s model was developed as a modification of Crosson and colleague’s
(1989) Pyramid Model. This model purports that awareness is not a unitary construct, as
supported by neuroanatomical studies that show multiple areas and neural pathways that are
associated with awareness (Crosson et al., 1989; Toglia & Kirk, 2000). Toglia and Kirk’s model
suggests that there are two types of awareness: metacognitive knowledge and online awareness.
Metacognitive Knowledge (also called intellectual knowledge) is the overall knowledge and
beliefs about the self or one’s own impairments. Metacognitive Knowledge exists outside of
engagement in a task or situation. Online Awareness is activated within tasks and situations.
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There are two types of Online Awareness. Online anticipatory awareness is the ability to predict
problems before they occur as a result of a deficit. Online emergent awareness is the ability to
monitor performance and to recognize errors while they occur. Both Metacognitive Knowledge
and emergent awareness are necessary for anticipatory awareness because pre-existing
knowledge and self-awareness interact within the context of the task. Some suggest that
anticipatory and emergent awareness may be related to each other and separate from
metacognitive awareness (O'Keeffe, Murray, et al., 2007; Rosen et al., 2014). Similar to the
other models of awareness, affective states are thought to influence expectations of performance.
Other factors that contribute to unawareness include issues with self-knowledge, overestimation
of task performance prior to task performance and task performance itself. Other contributing
factors of unawareness that have similarly been identified in other models include the ability to
self-monitor, the inability to adjust performance, difficulty with self-evaluation, and the inability
to integrate new experiences over time. A weakness of this model is that it does not identify
specific cognitive (e.g. memory, executive functioning) or emotional factors that may contribute
to the development of metacognitive and online awareness. The model also distinguishes
unawareness from denial, which is a psychological response to deficits rather than a true lack of
recognition of deficits. They suggest that denial is a coping response that tends to be
accompanied by blaming external sources, hostility, and anger, while true unawareness is
accompanied by perplexity, surprise or indifference. They caution that unawareness and denial
may occur simultaneously.
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Anatomical Correlates of Awareness
Several models of anosognosia have suggested that anosognosia is a multifaceted
construct and therefore is associated with many different brain regions. In healthy individuals,
there is evidence for a large-scale, supramodal network that mediates appraisal of self-relevant
content regardless of content domain (Schmitz & Johnson, 2007). These large neural networks
include prefrontal and temporal regions, the inferior parietal lobe, angular gyrus, and
supramarginal gyrus. Activation is often more pronounced in the right hemisphere (Decety &
Sommerville, 2003; Keenan et al., 2001; Keenan et al., 2000; Rosen, 2011; Toglia & Kirk,
2000). Additionally, the dorsorostral anterior cingulate cortex may be involved in the effortful
regulation of attention to introspective information (Krueger 2009).
Accurate self-awareness involves encoding and retrieval of self-relevant information, a
process that involves the medial prefrontal cortex (PFC) (Northoff et al., 2006; Schmitz &
Johnson, 2007; Shany-Ur et al., 2014). Studies have shown that the medial PFC is most active
when participants think about themselves, such as personality traits, mental states, and physical
attributes, compared to when they think about others. This suggests that the medial PFC is
involved in self-reflection processes (Jenkins & Mitchell, 2011). Conceptualizations of the
actions of others are associated with the dorsal medial prefrontal cortex (DMPFC) while selfconcept is associated with the ventral medial prefrontal cortex (VMPFC), though others who are
more closely related to the person also activate ventral areas (D'Argembeau et al., 2007; Herbert,
Herbert, & Pauli, 2011). Schmitz and Johnson (2007) suggested that two top-down networks are
involved in self-appraisal. First, the ventral medial prefrontal cortex-subcortical network is
involved with orienting to pre-attentive biasing information that is self-relevant. The dorsal
medial prefrontal cortex-subcortical network is involved with introspection such as self-
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reflection, evaluation, and recollection. Some have suggested that the dorsal medial PFC is
related to more anticipatory inferences related to goal achievement while the VMPFC enables
inference of emotional response and reward value following goal achievement (Krueger, Barbey,
& Grafman, 2009). In addition to prefrontal regions, anterior regions of the temporal lobes are
believed to play a role in storing knowledge and facts about the self and other individuals (Zahn
et al., 2007; Zamboni et al., 2013).
Neuroanatomical findings in healthy populations are congruent with studies of awareness
in neurodegenerative populations. In a study of neurodegenerative disease patients (i.e.
Amyotrophic Lateral Sclerosis (ALS), mild cognitive impairment (MCI), Alzheimer’s disease
(AD), and Frontotemporal dementia), increased self-awareness was associated with greater right
VMPFC activity and volume (Rosen et al., 2010). In a PET study of AD patients, impaired selfevaluation was associated with reduced activity in orbital prefrontal and medial temporal
structures (Salmon et al., 2006). In an fMRI study, AD patients had to answer questions related
to cognitive, behavioral and physical traits about themselves and their study partner. Activity
was observed in the medial prefrontal cortex and anterior temporal lobes for MCI and control
patients when rating both self and the informant, suggesting that these areas are associated with
self-evaluation and also possibly evaluation of familiar individuals. For AD patients, however,
the medial PFC was only activated during the other rating condition, not self-rating. Left anterior
temporal lobe activation was decreased during the self-evaluation portion but increased during
the other-evaluation condition. Larger discrepancies between self and caregiver report were
associated with reduced activity in the medial prefrontal cortex and anterior temporal regions
during the self-evaluation procedures. This suggests that the medial prefrontal cortex is involved
with updated self-awareness (Zamboni et al., 2013).
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The right hemisphere, in particular, has also been associated with self-awareness. Five
right-handed patients undergoing the Wada test were shown pictures of faces that were created
by morphing the patient’s face with a famous person’s face. Following recovery after anesthesia
of each hemisphere, participants were presented with the two original unmorphed faces and were
asked to choose which face they had seen previously. Following anesthesia of the left
hemisphere, all patients selected their own face, while following right hemisphere anesthesia,
four out of five patients selected the famous face. Similar results were found when they tested
ten normal participants and used TMS to stimulate the right or left motor cortex (Keenan et al.,
2001).
Anatomical substrates of anosognosia in symptomatic HD patients have yet to be studied,
except one study of motor symptom anosognosia. A decrease in striatal volumes (i.e. left and
right caudate and putamen) has been shown to be related to unawareness of motor symptoms in
HD patients (Justo et al., 2013). McCusker and Loy (2014) suggested that given research in other
neurodegenerative diseases and anosognosia, frontostriatal pathway disruptions are a likely
contributor to impaired awareness in HD. McCusker and Loy (2014) also cited studies that have
demonstrated increased denial of deficits following right basal ganglia infarcts, also supporting
the idea that these pathways may be associated with increased unawareness.

Measuring Anosognosia
Challenges exist in developing methods to study and operationalize anosognosia, which
also creates challenges in comparing studies that use different methodology. Current methods
include clinician ratings of patient unawareness, discrepancy scores between patient and
informant report, discrepancies between patient report and task performance, or a combination of
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the three methods (Clare, 2004; Nurmi & Jehkonen, 2014). Nurmi and Jehkonen (2014)
indicated that many researchers only use one method in studies. In the future, perhaps using
multiple methods within the same study can alleviate some of the challenges associated with
measuring anosognosia by providing more information on the convergent validity of these
methods.

Self-Report and Interviewing Methods
Regarding discrepancies between patient and informant report, informants are theorized
to be better able to give accurate ratings than patients. The use of questionnaires is advantageous
in that they are easily administered, allow for the assessment of a wide range of functioning (e.g.
activities of daily living, mood, cognitive functioning) and can be compared to different
objective measures such as cognitive tests or neurologic motor exams. However, informant
ratings are subjective, as other factors such as the caregiver’s personality, quality of the
relationship, and caregiver burden may influence informants’ report (Clare, 2004; Hoth, 2005;
Prigatano & Johnson, 2003; Toglia & Kirk, 2000). Clinicians may be more objective than
caregivers and may be more familiar with the concept of unawareness and expectations of
functioning in neurologic populations. However, clinicians rarely observe patients in real-world
settings and typically obtain information from caregivers and patients, which may reduce
objectivity of clinicians’ rating (Clare, 2004; Hoth, 2005; Prigatano & Johnson, 2003). Some
suggest patient/informant discrepancies are more valid for measuring awareness of everyday
function, while clinician ratings may be more valid for measuring awareness of cognitive
functioning, as studies have indicated that relationships between factors influencing awareness
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are moderated based on measurement method used (Snow et al., 2005; Tremont & Alosco,
2011).

Performance Prediction and Evaluation Method
The performance prediction and evaluation method involves the participant reporting on
how well he or she will complete a task (prediction) or how well he or she has completed a task
(evaluation). The outcome measure is quantifiable, as several research groups have come up with
methods to measure performance prediction such as analog scales and bell curves. Convergent
validity has been demonstrated for bell curve methods in dementia populations; high correlations
(i.e. above r=.8) have been found when comparing verbal prediction ratings and predictions
using bell curve ratings (Williamson et al., 2009). Performance prediction and evaluation
methods are considered the most objective measures of awareness because of the non-reliance on
either a clinician or an informant. However, this method can only be used for tasks where
performance can be measured by direct observation (e.g. a driving test) and cannot be used to
measure other more inferred psychological constructs (e.g. depression). Furthermore, the
ecological validity of this method must be considered. If a person had not been exposed to a
similar task previously, it may be difficult for him or her to predict performance, regardless of
how aware he or she is (Hoth, 2005; Williamson et al., 2009). Another consideration is
performance prediction methods are not tapping into a pathological deficit, but rather a common
feature of human cognition. For instance, Tversky and Kahneman (1974) suggested that
heuristics, or mental shortcuts, may lead to errors in judgment. Specifically, availability
heuristics influence the tendency of making decisions based on how easily past events come to
mind. Confirmation biases is another heuristic that involves the tendency to seek out information
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that confirms existing beliefs (Nickerson, 1998). If a person has a specific belief about his or her
own cognitive abilities, they may discount information that does not match his or her beliefs.
Even though heuristics may influence prediction and evaluation, it does appear that both healthy
individuals and AD patients adjust their predictions after performing the same task several times
(Ansell & Bucks, 2006).
!
Anosognosia Studies in Huntington’s disease

Metacognitive Knowledge of Behaviors
Several studies have examined awareness of behavioral functioning in both prodromal
and symptomatic HD patients. Most studies have used patient/informant discrepancy scores to
determine unawareness of deficits in this population. In a study examining patient and informant
agreement in prodromal HD patients, informants rated patients higher on all three subscales of
the Frontal Systems Behavior Scale (FrSBe), which include Apathy, Disinhibition, and
Executive Dysfunction when compared to gene negative at risk relatives. Both patient and
informant report were related to motor symptoms as rated on a neurologic exam. However, only
informant ratings were related to neuropsychological test performance. The authors also reported
that when closer to HD diagnosis, prodromal patients showed greater discrepancies from
informant ratings on FrSBe scales, which was interpreted as possible decreased awareness
associated with disease progression. However, for those patients closest to predicted conversion
to manifest HD, patient and informant ratings eventually became more consistent. The authors
suggested that those in the earlier prodromal phase might be able to detect prefrontal dysfunction
better than informants. As these symptoms become more pronounced, however, informants may
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be better able to identify these symptoms (Duff et al., 2010). A continuation of this pattern using
the FrSBe has been found in manifest patients. One study found no discrepancies between
patient and informant report for those patients with less motor symptom progression, while
informants tended to rate patients as more severe on the measure for patients with more severe
motor symptoms. Additionally, only informant ratings of executive dysfunction and apathy were
related to the severity of motor symptoms while patient ratings were not related (Hergert,
Sanchez-Ramos, & Cimino, 2015). Another study that examined patient awareness in
symptomatic HD patients found that when compared to informant ratings, patients overestimated
their ratings of themselves in regards to behavioral and emotional control as well as their ability
to manage activities of daily living. The most disagreement was found regarding emotional
functioning. Furthermore, only informant ratings were associated with findings on the
neurological exam. Interestingly, unawareness was associated with executive function and
memory performance (Hoth et al., 2007).
Chatterjee et al. (2005) found that agreement between HD patient and informant report of
neuropsychiatric symptoms, such as depression, apathy, and irritability, depended on the level of
cognitive impairment present, with lower agreement observed when patients had worsening
cognition. In a study examining awareness of dysexecutive behavior in HD, patients were found
to more accurately rate their caregivers dysexecutive behaviors than their own dysexecutive
behaviors, suggesting that HD patients are generally able to report on these behaviors in other
people, but may have limited awareness of their own behaviors (Ho et al., 2006). In another
study comparing anosognosia in HD and Parkinson’s disease (PD), only informant report of
dysexecutive behaviors was related to performance on tests of executive function for both HD
patients and PD patients, though HD patients demonstrated more unawareness of executive
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dysfunction than the PD patients (Sitek et al., 2013). Education has also been suggested to be
associated with awareness in HD. One study showed that educated patients had an earlier age of
onset, but had less severe symptoms. Authors have suggested more educated individuals may
recognize symptoms earlier than those with less education (López‐Sendón et al., 2011).
Two studies have examined awareness of memory deficits in HD. One study found that
HD patients underestimate their memory functioning, as measured by patient-caregiver
discrepancy scores, and that this underestimation of performance increases with disease
progression as measured by the severity of motor symptoms. Both patient and informant report,
however, were unrelated to memory performance on an objective memory measure (Sitek et al.,
2012). Another study that measured awareness by correlating self-report and objective memory
performance found that patients earlier in the disease process were more accurate at evaluating
their own memory than informants, while informant ratings were more accurate for patients later
in the disease process (de Langavant et al., 2013).

Online Awareness
Online awareness is awareness of proficiency of performance before or after a task.
Online awareness in HD has mainly focused on awareness of motor symptoms. In a study that
used a videotaped interview to compare patient report to observed movements, anosognosia for
chorea was observed in almost all participants. Controls were also interviewed in the same
manner except the motor “symptoms” reported were normal involuntary movements such as
twitches and postural changes. Results indicated that controls and prodromal HD patients were
just as unaware of involuntary movements as early HD patients of their chorea, suggesting
unawareness of movement observed in HD patients may not be pathological (Justo et al., 2013).
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In another study of prodromal patients (PREDICT-HD data), 50% of patients who began to
exhibit motor symptoms over the course of the study were unaware of their motor symptoms.
Awareness was associated with increased depression (McCusker et al., 2013). HD patients have
been shown to be less aware of involuntary movements than advanced PD patients (Sitek et al.,
2011).
Limited research has been conducted examining metacognitive knowledge and online
awareness in HD. Most studies suggest that awareness of cognition, behavioral and emotional
functioning decreases as impairments in motor functioning and cognition increase. Furthermore,
online awareness of motor symptoms has only been examined. Poorer self-awareness in HD may
be related to a decline in orbitofrontal-limbic system functioning in HD, as HD patients may fail
to attach a negative evaluation to impairments (Sitek et al., 2011).

Anosognosia in Other Neurodegenerative Populations

Alzheimer’s Disease (AD)
Unawareness in Alzheimer’s disease (AD) is nonspecific, as unawareness has been
demonstrated across domains such as memory, executive functioning, language, and activities of
daily living. Some have suggested that decline in memory abilities may be a contributor to
unawareness in this population as patients are not able to remember new information about
themselves (Mograbi, Brown, & Morris, 2009). In patients with probable AD, awareness of
neurocognitive, behavioral and psychiatric disturbance predicted greater depressed mood and
anxiety and less apathy while controlling for global cognition as measured by the Mini-Mental
Status Exam (Horning, Melrose, & Sultzer, 2014). In a study examining the diagnostic
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sensitivity of self and informant reports of cognition and cognitive testing in the prediction and
detection of AD, informant report of current memory problems, changes in memory, and
perceptions of the participant’s cognitive abilities were found to predict diagnosis, while selfreports of the same information did not. This suggests that informants may be more accurate in
describing patient behavior than AD patients themselves (Rabin et al., 2012).
In a study of online awareness of memory performance, AD patients and controls were
given three different word lists that they would need to remember. Before each trial, participants
were asked how many words they would remember. While AD patients had larger discrepancies
between their predictions and actual words they recalled than controls, the results suggested that
AD patients were able to revise their predictions based on past experiences. The authors
suggested that perhaps in AD, the comparator mechanism, which is controlled by executive
functioning, is somewhat preserved. This hypothesis is congruent with the idea that executive
functioning is relatively preserved in AD compared to subcortical dementias (Ansell & Bucks,
2006). This is also supported by a more recent study that demonstrated AD patients were able to
downgrade performance evaluation following a task when compared to their initial predictions,
while frontotemporal dementia patients, a disease where executive dysfunction is more
prominent, were less likely to downgrade performance (Williamson et al., 2009).
In a study of AD patients, unawareness of cognitive deficits was related to more apathy,
cognitive impairment, and delusions, and less depression. Unawareness of behavioral deficits,
however, was not related to cognitive impairment but was related to disinhibition and
pathological laughter. Apathy was found to be the main correlate of anosognosia, suggesting that
unawareness of deficits is more closely related to emotional changes than it is to cognitive
impairment (Landes et al., 2001; Starkstein, Sabe, Chemerinski, Jason, & Leiguarda, 1996).
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Parkinson’s Disease (PD)
Awareness in PD appears to be relatively preserved compared to other neurodegenerative
populations as patients often report more impairments than informants. PD patients have been
shown to report more executive dysfunction than healthy controls. Mild PD patients and
caregivers had similar responses, indicating that patients have relatively good insight into their
problems (Koerts et al., 2012). In another study, patient ratings indicated more impairment than
informant ratings, except for apathy, which was the only area where patient and informant
ratings were in agreement (McKinlay et al., 2008). Imaging studies in PD have suggested that in
early PD, dopamine (DA) depletion is more severe in the putamen rather than the caudate.
Furthermore, DA depletion is greatest in the rostrodorsal portion of the caudate, which is
associated with connections to the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex, areas associated with executive
functions. Ventral regions of the caudate are connected to ventromedial portions of the prefrontal
cortex, and functions of these areas, such as probabilistic learning, are often spared early in the
disease (Cools, 2006; Cools, Barker, Sahakian, & Robbins, 2001; Leh, Petrides, & Strafella,
2010; Poletti & Bonuccelli, 2012). Perhaps awareness is relatively preserved in PD because the
VMPFC is spared early in the disease.

Frontotemporal Dementia (FTD)
FTD is another disorder in which anosognosia is frequently observed. In a study
examining different metacognitive and online awareness among the behavioral variant of FTD,
corticobasal degeneration (CBD) and progressive supranuclear palsy (PSP) patients,
metacognitive awareness was examined using a patient-caregiver discrepancy on the Patient
Competency Rating Scale (PCRS), a measure specific to awareness and a clinician interview of
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awareness. Anticipatory awareness was measured by performance prediction on cognitive
testing. Emergent awareness was measured using a Go/No-Go task where the participant had to
acknowledge every time they made an error by saying “hit.” FTD, CBD, and PSP are frequently
associated with abnormal tau protein and are all associated with atrophy of the frontal and/or
temporal lobes. All three patient groups were impaired across all three types of awareness
described in the model. They found that the FTD group, however, showed greater online
emergent awareness impairment than the CBD and PSP groups, which the authors suggested
may be related to more severe prefrontal cortex damage that is more commonly found in FTD
compared to the other disorders (O'Keeffe, Murray, et al., 2007). In another study, FTD patients
showed greater behavioral unawareness than AD patients and healthy controls. FTD, AD, and
control group performance prediction ratings were positively correlated to performance. When
examining FTD subtypes, however, behavioral subtype (social dysexecutive) patients had
difficulty predicting performance on a word memory task, while those with progressive nonfluent aphasia had difficulty predicting verbal association fluency performance (Eslinger et al.,
2005). In a study examining awareness of cognition in AD and the behavioral variant of FTD
patients, both groups showed an impaired feeling of knowing accuracy compared to controls and
the severity of impairment was greater for the FTD group. Past research suggests a strong link
between prefrontal cortex functioning and feeling of knowing ability. Additionally, FTD
patients did not adjust performance predictions when provided feedback, which the authors noted
is consistent with past findings that FTD patients are insensitive to negative feedback (Rosen et
al., 2014). This supports the idea that anosognosia in FTD is related to a failure in online
monitoring.
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Summary of Anosognosia in Neurodegenerative Disorders
In the neurologic patient populations described above, including HD, changes in
awareness are associated with cognitive and emotional factors. When comparing patient groups,
it appears that patients with more significant executive functioning (e.g. FTD) and memory (e.g.
AD) impairments tend to demonstrate more severe symptoms of unawareness. In Parkinson’s
disease, awareness appears to be relatively spared, especially earlier in the disease progression,
which may be due to the sparing of the VMPFC. Across disorders, patients with apathy tend to
have higher rates of unawareness, suggesting a connection between awareness and emotional and
motivational factors.

Rationale of the Current Study

Clinical Implications of Anosognosia in HD
Anosognosia is important to study in HD because it has several implications for the
clinical care of patients as well as our understanding of anosognosia more generally. Studying
unawareness of executive dysfunction may be particularly valuable, as behavioral executive
function is associated with overall functioning in instrumental activities of daily living
(IADLs)(Karzmark, Llanes, Tan, Deutsch, & Zeifert, 2012). Several studies have demonstrated
that in different neurologic patient populations, anosognosia can impact the quality of life of the
patient and caregiver (Rymer et al., 2002). For example, anosognosia in AD patients is related to
less patient depression and reported better quality of life. However, it is also related to greater
caregiver burden and greater discrepancies between patient and caregiver quality of life (CondeSala et al., 2013). In a study of TBI patients and their caregivers, caregiver distress was
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significantly correlated with caregiver perception of patient unawareness (Prigatano, Borgaro,
Baker, & Wethe, 2005). Additionally, anosognosia may inflict a financial burden on families for
patients who need supervision because they are at risk for wandering or engaging in other risky
behaviors such as driving (Rosen, 2011).
In HD specifically, unawareness can delay diagnosis and/or become a barrier to treatment
(e.g. swallowing evaluations, obtaining proper walking aids). Unawareness may cause conflict
within families between those who may be unaware and do not want to know their genetic status
versus family members who do want to know their genetic status. Furthermore, for those who are
still employed or still engaging in other instrumental activities of daily living such as driving,
unawareness of certain cognitive and functional limitations may compromise the safety of the
patient and others who may be impacted by the patient’s actions. Additionally, it is important to
understand who retains awareness, as those individuals are at increased risk for depression,
anxiety, and suicide (McCusker & Loy, 2014).

Examining the Relationship Among Anosognosia and Cognitive and Mood Factors
In most theoretical models, anosognosia is theorized to be a multifaceted construct that is
associated with deficits in many brain regions and cognitive domains. Most models of
anosognosia in the context of neurodegenerative diseases suggest that there are relationships
between awareness and executive functioning, emotion, and memory (Clare et al., 2011;
Mograbi & Morris, 2014; Rosen, 2011).
Executive Functioning. Executive functioning is an umbrella term that describes
purposeful, goal-directed behavior (Banich, 2009) or mental operations that are needed in novel
or in non-routine situations, in which there is not an established stimulus-response association
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(Gilbert & Burgess, 2008).!As described in several of the models above, executive functioning
appears to be an essential component in self-monitoring, self-evaluating and the organization and
retrieval of relevant autobiographical memories (Morris & Mograbi, 2013; Robertson, 2010).
Due to executive functional impairments that often observed in both prodromal and symptomatic
stages of the disease, it is likely that prefrontal dysfunction through degeneration of frontalstriatal pathways plays a role in anosognosia (McCusker & Loy, 2014; Sitek et al., 2014).
Emotion. Several models of awareness suggest emotional factors are important
contributors to anosognosia because emotion impacts the salience of stimuli. The more salient
the stimulus, the more likely one will remember it and refer to it later (Mograbi & Morris, 2014;
Rosen, 2011; Stuss & Alexander, 2000). Anosognosia has been shown to be a predictor of severe
apathy (Starkstein, Brockman, Bruce, & Petracca, 2010). Apathy has been defined as lack of
motivation, which cannot be attributed to emotional distress, cognitive deficits, or loss of
consciousness (Marin, 1991).
Apathy may be implicated in awareness in HD. Apathy is a common frontally mediated
behavioral disturbance in HD, with studies reporting that between 32-50% of patients experience
some degree of symptoms (Hamilton et al., 2003; Naarding & Janzing, 2003; Paulsen, Ready,
Hamilton, Mega, & Cummings, 2001; Van Duijn et al., 2010). The anterior cingulate cortex has
been implicated in unawareness, error monitoring, and apathy (Beste, Saft, Andrich, Gold, &
Falkenstein, 2006; Landes et al., 2001; Lavretsky, Ballmaier, Pham, Toga, & Kumar, 2007;
Tekin & Cummings, 2002). This structure is impacted in HD through degeneration of projections
from the striatum (Beste et al., 2006).
Preservation of awareness does seem to be a risk factor for developing depression. In AD,
more depression is associated with less anosognosia (Mograbi & Morris, 2014; Starkstein et al.,
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1996; Verhey, Rozendaal, Ponds, & Jolles, 1993). In schizophrenia, those with preserved
awareness after the first psychotic episode are more likely to develop depression and commit
suicide four years after the episode (Crumlish et al., 2005). According to the Beck model of
depression, patients view themselves, their current situation, and their future situation negatively
(Coyne & Gotlib, 1983). Some have suggested that depression is associated with less
anosognosia due to a negative bias when reporting on problems related to symptoms. Another
suggestion is that increased awareness of difficulties may lead to reactive depression, suggesting
a protective role of anosognosia (Mograbi & Morris, 2014).
Memory. Finally, while memory appears to be an essential aspect of the development of
the sense of self, it is unclear if changes in memory functioning significantly contribute to the
development of anosognosia in HD. Some memory deficits are observed in HD but are often
related to a decline in executive functioning as opposed to a true deficit in the ability to encode
and retain memories. Memory retrieval is often impaired, but performance often improves when
HD patients are provided information in a recognition format or when cued (Lezak, Howieson,
Bigler, & Tranel, 2012). Hoth et al. (2007) reported that overall memory performance on the
Dementia Rating Scale – 2 (DRS-2) was associated with unawareness in HD. It is unclear,
however, which aspect of memory functioning may be contributing to unawareness and therefore
a more comprehensive measure of memory is needed to examine how memory relates to
unawareness in this population. Specifically, it remains unclear if there is an actual deficit in a
specific aspect of memory (e.g. encoding, storage) that is associated with unawareness in HD, or
if the memory problems are actually due to executive dysfunction resulting in a retrieval issue.
Studying how executive dysfunction, emotion/motivation, and memory are related to
anosognosia can inform which factors most strongly contribute to unawareness in HD.
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Additionally, this will allow for the examination of which model of anosognosia may best fit the
pattern of unawareness observed in HD.

Rationale for Methods
Using Discrepancy Scores to Measure Metacognitive Awareness. Informant or
collateral report is one of several sources of information used in clinical decision-making for the
HD population. Patient/informant discrepancy scores have been used to measure metacognitive
knowledge, or one’s overall knowledge of oneself or one’s condition (O'Keeffe, Dockree,
Moloney, Carton, & Robertson, 2007; O'Keeffe, Murray, et al., 2007; Toglia & Kirk, 2000). It
has been suggested that discrepancy scores may be a suitable method to measure unawareness in
HD. When HD patients report on another person’s behavior, agreement between the patient and
that person is high. However, when patients’ ratings of their own functioning and behavior are
compared to informant report, the discrepancies between the reports are larger, suggesting more
disagreement. This suggests that discrepancies between patient and informant ratings may
indicate a decrease in self-awareness (Ho et al., 2006; Hoth et al., 2007).
Using Performance Prediction and Evaluation to Measure Online Awareness.
Measuring two types of anosognosia (i.e. Metacognitive Knowledge and Online Awareness) may
provide more information about this multifaceted construct, as different factors (i.e. Executive
Dysfunction, Apathy, and Memory) may be related to these types of awareness in a different
fashion. A performance prediction and evaluation paradigm was included in the study to further
examine HD patient awareness of performance on specific tasks. The performance prediction
and evaluation technique is thought to allow for the measurement of Online Awareness from the
Toglia and Kirk Model (Banks & Weintraub, 2008; O'Keeffe, Dockree, et al., 2007; O'Keeffe,
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Murray, et al., 2007; Rosen et al., 2010; Toglia & Kirk, 2000). Specifically, performance
prediction is thought to measure Anticipatory Awareness, while performance evaluation is
thought to be a measure of error monitoring or Emergent Awareness (Banks & Weintraub,
2008). Several research groups have used performance prediction and evaluation methods with
other neurodegenerative populations. This technique, however, has yet to be used in HD patients
except for studies of motor awareness, which indicated that patients were unaware of their
movements (Justo et al., 2013).
To obtain performance prediction and evaluation estimates, a method of asking
participants to rate their performance on a bell curve was used. The bell curve method is
advantageous over other performance prediction and evaluation methods because predictions,
evaluations, and test scores will be on the same scale (i.e. percentiles) and are therefore more
easily compared. The bell curve method has been used in performance prediction and evaluation
studies in AD and FTD patients (Rosen et al., 2010; Williamson et al., 2009).
Some have suggested performance prediction may be more difficult for tasks that are not
generally engaged during everyday functioning (Williamson et al., 2009). Because of the specific
interest in examining Online Awareness of executive functioning and memory, participants
predicted and evaluated their performance on the Everyday Functioning Executive Function and
Memory subtests from the Neuropsychological Assessment Battery (NAB) The tasks were
chosen as more ecologically valid measures of executive functioning and memory because the
tasks were created to reflect tasks that may be encountered in everyday life (e.g. driving,
remembering medication instructions). These tasks have been used in a performance prediction
and evaluation study of Alzheimer’s disease and frontotemporal dementia patients (Williamson
et al., 2009).
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Purpose of the Current Study
The purpose of this study was to examine how cognitive (i.e. Executive Functioning and
Memory) and emotional factors (i.e. Apathy) contribute to Metacognitive Knowledge and Online
Awareness in symptomatic HD. Metacognitive Awareness of Executive Dysfunction, Memory,
and Apathy and Online Awareness of Executive Dysfunction and Memory were examined.

Main Hypotheses

Hypothesis One - Metacognitive Knowledge
(1) Cognitive Executive Functioning, clinician-rated Apathy, and cognitive Memory will
be independently associated with Metacognitive Knowledge of Executive Functioning, Apathy,
and Memory as measured by informant and patient discrepancies on self - report measures. (2)
Executive Functioning and Memory will be positively associated with Metacognition Knowledge,
while Apathy will have a negative association. (3) Apathy and Executive Dysfunction will be
more strongly related to Metacognitive Knowledge than Memory.

Hypothesis Two - Anticipatory Awareness
(1) Cognitive Executive Functioning, clinician-rated Apathy, and cognitive Memory will
be independently associated with Anticipatory Awareness of Executive Functioning and Memory
as measured by performance prediction on tasks of everyday functioning. (2) Executive
Functioning and Memory will be positively associated with Anticipatory Awareness while
Apathy will be negatively associated. (3) Apathy and Executive Dysfunction will have stronger
relationships with Anticipatory Awareness than Memory.
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Hypothesis Three - Emergent Awareness
(1) Cognitive Executive Functioning, clinician-rated Apathy, and cognitive Memory will
be independently associated with Emergent Awareness of Executive Functioning and Memory as
measured by performance evaluation on tasks of everyday functioning. (2) Executive
Functioning and Memory will be positively associated with awareness while Apathy will be
negatively associated. (3) Apathy and Executive Dysfunction will be greater contributing factors
to Emergent Awareness in HD than Memory.

Outcome Variables:
Metacognitive
Knowledge!Domains

Predictor
Variables

Cognitive
Executive
Functioning
(Factor
Score)

Apathy
(FrSBe – Apathy
Discrepancies)

ClinicianRated Apathy
!(AES-C
Total)

Executive
Dysfunction
(FrSBe –
Executive
Dysfunction!
Discrepancies)

Memory
(HVLT-R
Recognition
Score)

Memory
(Everyday
Memory
Questionnaire-R
Discrepancies)

Figure 1. Hypothesis One.
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Outcome Variables:
Anticipatory
Awareness Domains

Predictor
Variables

Cognitive Executive
Functioning (Factor
Score)

Predicting
Executive Function
Performance

ClinicianRated Apathy
(AES-C
Total)

Memory
(HVLT-R
Recognition)
Score)

Predicting
Memory
Performance

Figure 2. Hypothesis Two.
Predictor
Variables

Outcome Variables:
Emergent Awareness
Domains

Cognitive Executive
Functioning (Factor
Score)

Evaluating
Executive Function
Performance

ClinicianRated Apathy
(AES-C
Total)

Memory
(HVLT-R
Recognition)

Evaluating
Memory
Performance

Score)
Figure 3. Hypothesis Three.
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CHAPTER TWO:
METHODS
Participants
Sixty-one patients with a diagnosis of Huntington’s disease were recruited from the
Huntington’s Disease Society of America’s (HDSA) Center of Excellence Clinic at the
University of South Florida and signed informed consent. One additional patient was recruited
but did not have the capacity to provide informed consent and was not enrolled in the study. Five
participants who signed consent did not complete the study (one due to a history of head injury,
three did not want to complete the cognitive testing, and one had difficulty understanding how to
complete the self-report questionnaires). All five of these participants had informants who signed
consent for the study and completed the informant questionnaires in person, but the informant
data was not used in the final data analysis.
Participant Characteristics – Huntington’s Disease Patients
Fifty-six Huntington’s disease patients completed the study. In the final sample, there
were 20 males (35.7%) and 36 females (64.3%), ages ranged from 33-72 (M=52.71, SD=10.97),
and years of education ranged from 9-19 (M=13.86, SD=2.3). All participants identified
themselves as Caucasian. One participant identified as Hispanic/Latino(a), while 55 participants
identified as Non-Hispanic/Latino(a).
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Participant Inclusion Criteria. Participants were required 1) to be 18 years and older
and 2) have been diagnosed with manifest Huntington's disease. The HD diagnosis was defined
as ever having a rating of a “4” on the Unified Huntington’s Disease Rating Scale (UHDRS)
Diagnostic Confidence Interval (“motor abnormalities that are unequivocal signs of HD (≥ 99%
confidence)” and either had genetic testing with a positive result for the expanded CAG repeat or
a family history of HD with clinical confirmation by a movement disorder specialist. It was also
preferred that the participant had an informant who was willing to participate in the study.
Participant Exclusion Criteria. Individuals were excluded who 1) had a diagnosis of
another neurologic disorder other than HD, 2) were unable to complete questionnaires either due
to difficulties with reading the English language or significant impairment that hindered the
ability to complete the study protocol (i.e. in the advanced stage of dementia), or 3) were unable
to provide informed consent to be part of the study. The Montreal Cognitive Assessment
(MoCA) was used to help determine whether or not an individual had the cognitive ability to
provide informed consent for the study. Karlawish et al. (2013) reported that a score of 22 on the
MoCA provided good sensitivity (94%) in detecting Parkinson’s patients deemed not capable of
providing consent (Karlawish et al., 2013). Therefore, individuals with scores ≥22 were
considered capable of providing consent for the study. For those who scored less than 22, the
capacity to consent was determined by a health care professional on the study team. These
potential participants had to demonstrate that they understood what was explained to them in the
consent form by explaining key points of the study related procedures and that they understood
the risks and benefits of the study. Additionally, they needed to demonstrate that they understood
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that their decision to participate in the study was voluntary and they needed to explain why they
would like to participate.

Participant Characteristics – Informants
In the final sample, 55 of the 56 participants identified informants. If more than one
caregiver or informant was identified and wanted to participate, the informant who spent the
most time with the patient was asked to participate. Forty-one informants completed the study
procedures in person and nine completed the procedures through Qualtrics Survey Software, a
secure, online survey website. Five identified informants did not complete the survey. In the final
sample of 50 informants, there were 24 males (48%) and 26 females (52%), ages ranged from
18-72 (M=52.24, SD=14.44), and years of education ranged from 10-20 (M=14.24, SD=2.68).
There were no differences in age or education between the patient or informant groups (See
Table 1).
One informant identified as African American, one identified as mixed race, and 48
identified as Caucasian. One informant identified as Hispanic/Latino(a), while 49 participants
identified as Non-Hispanic/Latino(a). Informants were asked if they themselves were at risk of
developing Huntington’s disease. When multiple informants were available, informants who had
no family history of HD were preferred. Forty-three informants were not at risk because they
were unrelated to the patient (i.e. they had no family history of HD). Five informants were at
risk, meaning that they have a family history of HD, but were never tested for the gene. One
informant was gene-negative, meaning she had a family history of HD but had a negative genetic
test result. One informant had presymptomatic HD, meaning the informant tested positive for the
HD gene but had not yet developed manifest HD. The informants had the following relationships
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to the patients: 27 spouses, 7 children, 6 parents, 3 non-married significant others, 2 siblings, 2
ex-spouses, and 2 nieces, 1 friend. Informants knew the patients for an average of 29 years
(SD=14.68; Range: 1 year – 66 years). Informants were also asked to rate how well they knew
the information on a Likert scale based on the one used in Hoth et al., 2007 (See Table 2).

Table 1. Comparison between patient and informant demographic information.
Demographic:
Age

Patient
Mean: 52.71 (10.97)

Informant
Mean: 52.24 (14.44)

Education

Mean: 13.86 (2.3)

Mean: 14.24 (2.68)

Gender
Ethnicity

20 Male / 36 Female
1 Hispanic/Latino(a)
55 Non-Hispanic/Latino(a)
56 Caucasian

24 Male / 26 Female
1 Hispanic/Latino(a)
49 Non-Hispanic/Latino(a)
1 African American
1 Mixed
48 Caucasian
43 Not at risk, No family hx
5 At Risk, family hx
1 Tested gene negative
1 Presymptomatic HD, gene +

Race

HD
56 Symptomatic HD
Categorization

Table 2. Relationship Quality Based on Informant Report.
Quality of Knowing the Patient
Very Well
Pretty Well
Fairly Well
Not So Well
Hardly At All
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Number (%) of
informants
providing rating
46 (92%)
3 (6%)
1 (2%)
0
0
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Difference
Not
Significant
Not
Significant

Informant Inclusion/Exclusion Criteria. Informants must have 1) been 18 years or
older, 2) not have been diagnosed with manifest HD, 3) been capable of providing written,
informed consent, 4) must not have been diagnosed with a disorder that is associated with
cognitive impairment, 5) had the ability to understand and read English, and 6) if not present at
the appointment, must had been able to access questionnaires online and fill out the
questionnaires prior to or following the patient’s visit.

Participant Recruitment
HD patients who met the inclusion criteria and also provided consent to be a part of the
USF Huntington’s Disease Research Registry (IRB # Pro00010382) or part of the multi-site
Enroll-HD study were identified and contacted via phone to gauge interest in participation in the
study. Participants were able to complete study procedures before or following their regular
clinic visit with their neurologist or before or following another study (i.e. Enroll-HD). (See
Figure 4 and Table 3). Patients who were not enrolled in the registry or the Enroll-HD study
were approached by their HD neurologist, Juan Sanchez-Ramos, Ph.D., M.D. during their clinic
visit. If the patient was willing to hear more about the study, study staff explained the study to
them by verbally going through the consent. Staff obtained written consent if the patient and
informant were interested in participating. This discussion took place in a private room.

Table 3. Patient Recruitment Information for Final Sample.
Recruitment Source
Enroll – HD Study
USF HD Research Registry
Neurology Clinic
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Number of Enrolled Participants
Recruited From Source
37 (66%)
6 (11%)
13 (23%)
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~170 names obtained in registry, Enroll-HD and Clinic Appointments

86 patients were identified as possible candidates for the study

Reached 83 patients via phone or during their clinic visit
19 declined
participation

1 no-showed

2 excluded
(presymptomatic, severe
cognitive impairment)

62 were interested in participating

1 excluded (did not have capacity
to consent)

61 signed consent

5 excluded following consent
-1 due to history of severe TBI
-3 refused cognitive testing
-1 could not complete
questionnaires

56 completed the study

55 Identified Informants

41 informants
completed in
person

9 informants completed
via Qualtrics
Data was analyzed for 56
patients and 50 informants

Figure 4. Recruitment Flow-Chart.
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5 informants
could not be
reached

Measures
Self-Report Measures
The Frontal Systems Behavior Scale; Self and Family Rating Forms (After-Illness Ratings) were
used to assess patient and informants’ perception of current frontally mediated behaviors of the
patient to assess Metacognitive Knowledge of Apathy and Executive Dysfunction. It is a 46-item
questionnaire with subscales that assess Apathy, Disinhibition, and Executive Dysfunction.
Patients and informants rated frontally mediated behaviors on a five-point scale (1=almost never
to 5=almost always). T-scores greater than 65 indicate clinical significance. It has been shown to
have adequate internal reliability for Total scores (Cronbach’s α =.88) and Apathy (Cronbach’s
α =.72), Disinhibition (Cronbach’s α =.75), and Executive dysfunction (Cronbach’s α =.79)
subscales. Adequate internal reliability has also been found for the Family Form Total score
(Cronbach’s α =.92) and Apathy (Cronbach’s α =.78), Disinhibition (Cronbach’s α =.80), and
Executive dysfunction (Cronbach’s α =.87) subscales. The FrSBe has been shown to have good
convergent validity with the Neuropsychiatric Inventory. Additionally, FrSBe Family Ratings
have been used to discriminate between frontally mediated behavioral syndromes in AD and HD
(Stout, Ready, Grace, Malloy, & Paulsen, 2003). For the current study, the measure also had
adequate internal reliability for patient Total scores (Cronbach’s α =.919), Apathy (Cronbach’s α
=.816) Disinhibition (Cronbach’s α =.79), and Executive Dysfunction (Cronbach’s α =.815).
There was adequate consistency for the informant Total scores (Cronbach’s α =.929), Apathy
(Cronbach’s α =.845), Disinhibition, (Cronbach’s α =.847), and Executive Dysfunction
(Cronbach’s α =.875).
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Everyday Memory Questionnaire- Revised (Patient and Informant forms) is a 13-item measure of
memory failures in everyday life and was used to measure Metacognitive Knowledge of
memory. The 13-item version has two main factors: retrieval and attentional tracking. The
measure has been shown to have strong internal reliability (Cronbach’s α =.89) and good
discrimination between clinical and control groups (Royle & Lincoln, 2008). This measure has
previously been used to examine awareness of memory functioning in Parkinson’s patients
(Mack et al., 2013). In this sample, there was adequate internal consistency for both the selfreport form (Cronbach’s α =.939) and the informant-report form (Cronbach’s α =.934).

Caregiver Appraisal Scale (Informant Report Only) is a 28-item questionnaire using a 5-point
Likert Scale that assesses four dimensions of caregiving. Adequate reliability has been found for
each subscale: caregiving satisfaction (Cronbach’s α =.87-.77), caregiving mastery (Cronbach’s
α =.73-.52), impact of caregiving (Cronbach’s α =.78-.77), and subjective caregiving burden
(Cronbach’s α =.91-.89) (Lawton, Moss, Hoffman, & Perkinson, 2000; Struchen, Atchison,
Roebuck, Caroselli, & Sander, 2002). Concurrent validity has been demonstrated, as scores on
this measure are correlated with other caregiver burden measures. This scale has been used in
HD research (Pickett Jr, Altmaier, & Paulsen, 2007). The caregiving burden subscale was used to
control for caregiver burden. In this sample, there was adequate internal consistency for the
caregiver burden subscale (Cronbach’s α =.874).

Clinician Administered Measures
Apathy Evaluation Scale - Clinician Version (AES-C) is an 18-item clinician administered semistructured interview of global Apathy. Subscales include cognitive, behavioral, and emotional
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Apathy. Internal reliability has been shown to be adequate (Cronbach’s α =.86-.94). Test-retest
reliability varies from r=.76 to .94. Convergent had been established. The relationship between
clinician report and self-report is r=.72, p<.001 and clinician and informant report is r=.62,
p<.001. The measure has been shown to discriminate from clinician-rated depression, r= .39,
p<.001 and clinician-rated anxiety, r=.35, p<.01 (Marin, Biedrzycki, & Firinciogullari, 1991).
This measure was used as a predictor variable of awareness. In this sample, there was adequate
internal consistency for the total score (Cronbach’s α =.905).

Huntington’s Disease Diagnostic and Neurologic Measures
Unified Huntington’s Disease Rating Scale – Motor Scale is a 15-item neurological movement
scale administered by a movement disorder specialist with high ratings indicating greater
severity of motor symptoms. High internal consistency (Cronbach’s α =.95) and
intercorrelations between domains of the UHDRS have been found. It has also high interrater
reliability (intraclass correlation coefficient =.94 for total motor score) (Kremer & Huntington
Study Group, 1996). This measure was used to control for disease progression.

Unified Huntington’s Disease Rating Scale – Diagnostic Confidence Interval is a confidence
interval rating given by a trained movement disorder specialist that indicates the level of
certainty that the motor abnormalities observed during the motor exam are signs of Huntington’s
disease. Ratings range from 0-4, with 0 being normal, to 4 (motor abnormalities that are
unequivocal signs of HD (≥ 99% confidence) (Kremer & Huntington Study Group, 1996). This
measure was used to determine eligibility for this study. Only those who ever had a rating of a 4
were eligible to participate in the study.
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Cognitive Measures
Screening Measure. Montreal Cognitive Assessment (MoCA) is a cognitive screening
measure that examines different areas of cognitive function (i.e. executive function, language,
visuospatial, memory, attention, and orientation) that is used to detect cognitive impairment. The
MoCA is scored on a 30-point scale, with a score of 26 or above indicating normal performance.
The MoCA will be used to determine global cognitive impairment. Test-retest reliability has
been reported to be r=.92 and has adequate internal consistency (Cronbach’s α =.83). In this
sample, internal consistency was adequate (Cronbach’s α =.768). Convergent validity has been
demonstrated with a high correlation (r=.87) between the MoCA and the Mini-Mental Status
Exam (MMSE), another cognitive screening assessment (Hoops et al., 2009; Lezak et al., 2012;
Nazem et al., 2009). It has been suggested that for HD, the MoCA may be a more sensitive
screening tool than the MMSE because the MoCA is better suited to capture certain cognitive
functions, such as executive functioning (Mickes et al., 2010; Videnovic et al., 2010). This
measure was used to describe the severity of cognitive impairment of the sample and was used to
determine whether or not an individual had the cognitive ability to provide informed consent for
the study.
Executive Functioning Tasks. Executive Abilities: Measures and Instruments for
Neurobehavioral Evaluation and Research (EXAMINER) - Unstructured Task is a measure of
planning, value-based decision-making, self-regulation, and self –monitoring. This measure was
used as a predictor variable (Executive Functioning). The examinee is given three booklets with
five pages of simple puzzles that take between 4-60 seconds to complete. Each puzzle is worth a
different amount of points. Participants have six minutes to earn as many points as possible.
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Puzzles have different cost-benefit ratios. Test-retest reliability has been demonstrated to be
r=.71. It has been shown to be correlated with FrSBe scores (r=.29) and separates patients from
controls (F=11.2, p<.005) (NIH EXAMINER Manual). The task performance has been shown to
be associated with ventromedial prefrontal cortex damage (Robinson, Calamia, Gläscher, Bruss,
& Tranel, 2014). The EXAMINER battery has been validated in several neuropsychiatric
populations (Kramer et al., 2014). This battery has shown to be sensitive in HD patients (You et
al., 2014).

Stroop Test (Golden Version, 1976) is a test of inhibition and was used as a predictor variable
(Executive Functioning). Participants are given color words that are printed in different color ink
and are required to state the color of the ink in which the word is printed. The test takes
advantage of the differences in cognitive processing of words versus color identification, with
word reading being considered more of an automatic process. This causes interference when
trying to name the color of the ink the word is printed in and the prepotent response of reading
needs to be inhibited (Golden & Freshwater, 1978; Lezak et al., 2012). Test-retest reliability has
been reported as r=.86 (Word), r=.82 (color), and r=+.73 (Word-Color). The Stroop task has
been shown to have convergent validity with tasks of inhibition and processing speed, has been
shown to have predictive validity of functional status in a follow-up study of vascular dementia
patients (Strauss, Sherman, & Spreen, 2006).
Trail Making A & B (TMT) is a task involving scanning and visuomotor tracking, divided
attention and cognitive flexibility and will be used as a predictor variable (executive
functioning). For Part A, participants draw lines to connect numbered circles in consecutive
order as fast as possible. Part B requires participants to connect circles with numbers and letters
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by alternating between the two types of sets in consecutive order (Reitan & Wolfson, 1985).
Test-retest reliability for part A has been shown to range from r= .46-.89 and .44-.87 for part B.
Interrater reliability has been reported to be .94 for part A and .90 for Part B (Fals-Stewart,
1992{Strauss, 2006 #316).TMT has demonstrated validity, with significant relationships
between it and performance on several other executive function tasks of attention and set-shifting
(Strauss et al., 2006). The test has also been shown to be sensitive to individuals with brain
damage (Reitan, 1958).
Memory Task. Hopkins Verbal Learning Test – Revised (HVLT-R) is an auditory verbal
learning task where examinees are required to learn a list of items drawn from three semantic
categories. This test was used as a memory predictor variable of awareness. The task involves
immediate free recall, delayed free recall, and recognition trials. Test-retest reliability has been
shown to range from r=.74 for total recall, r=.66 for delayed recall, r=.39 for retention, and .r=4
for recognition discrimination. Convergent Validity studies indicate that total recall has been
shown to be correlated with the Wechsler Memory Scale, Logical Memory I (r=.75), and delayed
recall was associated with Logical memory II (r=.77). HVLT-R Retention score was related to
Logical Memory Savings score (Logical memory II divided by Logical Memory I) (r=.65). The
task has also been shown to adequately discriminate between AD and normal geriatric
individuals. Total recall in AD patients resulted in 95% sensitivity and 83% specificity. In VaD a
linear combination of total recall resulted in 85% correct classification (Brandt & Benedict,
2001).
Anticipatory and Emergent Awareness Tasks. Neuropsychological Assessment Battery
(NAB) Daily Living Tests (Stern & White, 2003) were developed to be highly congruent with
analogous real-world behavior and were developed to have stronger ecological validity than
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other clinical neuropsychological test measures. The following NAB tasks were used in this
study:
•

Driving Scenes Subtest (Attention Module) is a test where the examinee is shown a series
of six driving scenes from behind the steering wheel of a car and needs to indicate which
details have changed. The task is associated with visuospatial abilities, working memory,
visual scanning, attention to detail, and selective attention. The Driving Scenes test has
been shown to be related to an on-road driving test (r= .55, p<.01) in healthy controls and
mild dementia patients, providing some evidence for the ecological validity of the
measure (Brown et al., 2005). The Driving Scenes subtest is also related to the WMS-III
Digit Span Total (r=.32), Letter-Number Sequencing (r=.29), Mental Control (r=.32), and
Working Memory (r=.39).

•

Daily Living Memory (Memory Module) is a task of learning, storage, and free recall of
information encountered during everyday functioning. There are two subtasks. The first
is the Medication Instructions task, where examinees are presented with instructions for
taking medications that they need to remember. The second is the Name, Address, and
Phone Number task, where the examinee is to remember these pieces of information. The
subtest shows moderate correlations with criterion measures of visual and verbal
memory. The retention score is associated with CVLT-II Trials 1-5 total (r=.44) and long
delay free recall (r=.44). The recognition score is associated with CVLT-II Long Delay
Recognition (r=.39).

•

Judgment (Executive Functioning Module) is a task that asks examinees questions
pertaining to health and safety issues and is associated with problem-solving and
knowledge of safety. White and Stern (2003) indicated that judgment is associated with
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dorsal-lateral prefrontal cortex and connections to subcortical brain regions. Internal
consistency reliability of the measure has been demonstrated (Cronbach’s α=.83)
(MacDougall & Mansbach, 2013). The Judgment subtest is associated with TMT-B score
(r=.3) and Verbal Fluency (r=.46) in a non-impaired sample (Stern & White, 2003).

Procedures

Patients Recruited from the Neurology Clinic or HD Research Registry
Patients who were recruited from the clinic were asked if the data from the Montreal
Cognitive Assessment (MoCA) and the Unified Huntington’s Disease rating Scale Motor Exam
could be used for the study, as these procedures are typically completed during the course of the
patients’ regular visit. Motor score data were used if the motor exam was completed within one
year of the rest of the study procedures, as motor scores have been shown to significantly
increase by 6 points after a one year period (Siesling, van Vugt, Zwinderman, Kieburtz, & Roos,
1998). MoCA scores were used if completed within one month of the rest of the study
procedures. Nasreddine et al. (2005) have demonstrated high test-retest reliability for the MoCA
(r=.92, p<.001) after one month in healthy controls, mild cognitive impairment and AD patients,
with a 0.9 point change in score on average. Additionally, participants were asked for the
following demographic information: race, ethnicity, age, gender, highest level of education, age
of diagnosis, and onset of motor symptoms and CAG repeat number on the larger allele.
Information about current medications that may influence the motor score was obtained (e.g
Xenazine/Tetrabenazine, Risperdal/Risperidone). Patients were asked if their medications have
changed if they had completed their clinic visit on a different day than the study procedures. See
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Some information was obtained from the patients’ medical records if available. Appendix C for
detailed demographic information.

Participants Who Also Participated in Enroll-HD
Participants in the Enroll-HD study were asked if the information collected for the
Enroll-HD study could be used for this study. This information included demographics, motor
exam scores, CAG repeats, medications and cognitive test data (i.e. Trail Making Test). Patients
were asked if their medications had changed if they had completed their Enroll-HD visit on a
different day. Motor score data was used if the motor exam was completed within one year of the
rest of the study procedures. Trail Making Test scores were used if completed within one month
of the rest of the study procedures. A study in normal controls indicated no significant change in
Trail Making Test scores in a one year period (Basso, Bornstein, & Lang, 1999).

Study Procedures for All Participants
Patient procedures. Once enrolled, the participant completed the FrSBe Self-Rating
Form (current ratings only) and the Everyday Memory Questionnaire-Revised. Trained study
staff administered the AES-C to obtain clinician ratings of Apathy. The trained study staff
member also administered the cognitive tests in a counterbalanced order (See Appendix A). The
order of whether the participant completed the questionnaires or cognitive tests first was also
counterbalanced. Participants used a bell curve from the EXAMINER Battery to examine
Anticipatory and Emergent awareness of performance on the NAB tasks. Convergent validity
has been demonstrated for bell curve methods in dementia populations; high correlations (above
r=.8) have been found when comparing verbal prediction ratings and predictions using bell curve
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ratings (Williamson et al., 2009). Before and after each NAB task, the participant was asked to
evaluate his or her performance by indicating whether he or she was “above average, average, or
below average” compared to healthy individuals without Huntington’s disease and who were the
same gender, age, and education. The participant then had to indicate where he or she performed
on the bell curve. Please refer to Appendix A for the full script that was used.
Informant procedures. If the informant was present at the study appointment, the
patient and informant were separated to ensure the independence of the report. The study staff
reinforced that all data collected was kept confidential. Informants were given a short
questionnaire to obtain demographic information (age, education, gender, ethnicity, personal HD
status) and about their relation to the patient. These questions are similar to what was used for
another study of patient and informant agreement in HD patients (Hoth, 2005; Hoth et al., 2007).
See Appendix B for Informant Demographic Questionnaire. The informant completed the
following questionnaires: FrSBe-After Illness Ratings (Family Rating Form), Memory Abilities
Questionnaire (Informant Rating Form), and the Caregiver Appraisal Form. Informants who
completed the online survey signed the consent form electronically. After completion of the
study, all participants were debriefed and given the opportunity to ask questions about the study.
Confidentiality procedures. Participants were informed that data that was collected was
for study purposes and did not have their names or other identifying information associated with
it. Only the consent forms contained names. Potential participants were told that their
participation in this research was voluntary and the decision to participate would not affect their
treatment that they received at the University of South Florida.
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CHAPTER THREE:
RESULTS

Data were analyzed using IBM SPSS 24.0 for Mac, MPLUS Version 7.2, and SAS 9.4.
Please view Appendix D for general data diagnostic information.

Hypothesis One - Metacognitive Knowledge
(1) Cognitive Executive Functioning, clinician-rated Apathy, and cognitive Memory will
be independently associated with Metacognitive Knowledge of Executive Functioning, Apathy,
and Memory as measured by informant and patient discrepancies on self - report measures. (2)
Executive Functioning and Memory will be positively associated with Metacognition Knowledge,
while Apathy will have a negative association. (3) Apathy and Executive Dysfunction will be
more strongly related to Metacognitive Knowledge than Memory.

Main Proposed Analysis for Hypothesis One
A multivariate multiple regression approach using a path analysis framework in MPLUS
7.2 was used to determine if cognitive Executive Functioning, Memory performance, and
clinician-rated Apathy independently predicted Metacognitive Knowledge of Apathy, Executive
Dysfunction, and Memory. The benefit of using this approach was to compare relationships
across the individual regression analyses. Multiple imputation was used to maximize the data set
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(see Appendix D). Metacognitive Knowledge scores for Apathy and Executive Dysfunction were
calculated by subtracting the norm corrected-informant ratings from the norm-corrected patient
ratings of the FrSBe Apathy and Executive Dysfunction subscales. Metacognitive Knowledge
scores for Memory were calculated by separately adding items from the EMQ-R self and
informant reports to create two separate total scores and then subtracting informant scores from
patient scores. Five informants had missing items on the EMQ-R and their final scores were
prorated. Correlations among predictor and outcome variables were explored. Please view
Appendix E for results of correlational analyses.
In the multivariate multiple regression model, the Unstructured Task Standard Score,
Stroop Interference score, the HVLT-R Recognition Memory raw score, and the AES-C total
score were added to the model as the predictors. TMT scores were removed from all analyses to
improve power because it was unrelated to any awareness variable in the correlational analyses.
The original intended analysis was to complete a principle components analysis of the TMT-B/A
Ratio Adjusted score, Stroop Interference Standard Score, and the Unstructured Task Total
Points standard score to create a latent executive function variable. This variable was to be used
in the multivariate multiple regression analysis for the purpose of improving power. However,
the assumptions for PCA or creation of a composite score were not met because the three
variables did not have significant relationships with one another.
The following variables were added to control for demographic and disease
characteristics: age, education, gender, UHDRS motor score, and Subjective Caregiver Burden
subscale score from the Caregiver Appraisal Scale. The outcome variables (Metacognitive
Knowledge) were the Apathy (FrSBe), Executive Dysfunction (FrSBe), and Memory (EMQ-R)

!

48

discrepancy scores. Scores were converted to z-scores so all variables would be on the same
scale.
Examination of assumptions for regression for Hypothesis One. Tests of multivariate
normality suggested the residuals for the model did not statistically deviate from multivariate
normality, B1p=0.76, X2(10)=6.81, p=0.74, B2p=13.64, zupper=-1.24 zlower=-1.63. One data point
was identified as a multivariate outlier (Mahalanobis Distance=11.78; p<.01). The removal of
this data point did not change the results, so it was included in the final analysis. Assumptions
were also examined for each OLS regression model. Examination of scatterplots of the
standardized residuals, the standardized predicted values, and histogram plots of residuals
suggested that the assumptions of random errors, homoscedasticity, and linearity were met. The
Watson and Durbin test indicated that residuals were independent (values=2.12, 2.14).
Guidelines by Field (2009) were used to examine data points that may be outliers or unduly
influential to the model. There were no Cook’s d values greater than 1, nor were there any data
points with large leverage values. No data points were considered to be casewise outliers (+/2SD from the mean). However, three participants had large Mahalanobis distance values (>15).
Data analysis was completed with and without these participants to determine if their inclusion in
the analysis significantly changed the results. One participant’s data changed several predictors
from non-significant to significant when the data was included in the model. Therefore, it
appears that this one participant seems to be influencing the model’s results and was removed
from the final analysis. The other two participants’ inclusion or exclusion did not change the
results, therefore, they were included in the model to maximize the dataset. The results are
reported with 48 patient/informant pairs (Table 4).
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Examination of VIF and Tolerance values did not reveal serious problems with
multicollinearity, however, there were potential issues with multicollinearity for the Unstructured
Task total points standard score (VIF=2.6, Tol=.38) and UHDRS Total Motor Score (VIF=3.4,
Tol=.297). The Unstructured Task score and UHDRS Motor Score total were highly correlated
(r=-.689, p<.001). One method for handling multicollinearity is to remove one of the variables
that are problematic (Field, 2009). Given that the Unstructured Task total points score is one of
the main variables of interest, it was not ideal to remove it from the model. A hierarchical
regression approach for each outcome variable (Apathy discrepancy, Executive discrepancy, and
Memory discrepancy scores) was used to determine if motor scores explained significant
additional variance above and beyond the other variables in each of the OLS models as well as to
examine if the inclusion or exclusion of motor scores changed the results. Motor scores did not
explain additional variance in any of the individual OLS models (See Table 20 in Appendix E).
The Unstructured Task is a written task and is likely dependent on motor functioning, which may
explain the multicollinearity. Regardless, results presented include motor scores to continue to
have a representation of disease progression in the model. R2 were provided for each individual
regression model: Metacognitive Knowledge of Apathy, R2 = .411, p<.001; Metacognitive
Knowledge of Executive Dysfunction, R2 =.328, p<.01, and Metacognitive Knowledge of
Memory, R2 = .286, p<.05. See Table 3 and Figure 10 for results. Results of the model without
motor scores are provided in Appendix E.
Hypothesis One: Metacognitive Knowledge regression results. The Chi-square test of
model fit indicated that the saturated model fit significantly better than the model with regression
coefficients constrained to 0 for the model with motor scores, χ2 (27)=52.614, p<.01.
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Table 4. Metacognitive Analysis with motor scores (48 participants).
Apathy Awareness
Est.

SE

St. Est

Executive Awareness

Memory Awareness

Est.

Est.

SE

St. Est

SE

St.
Est.

Uns. Task

0.343

0.227

0.270

0.413+

0.247

0.319+

0.128

0.265

0.1

Stroop Int.

0.487*

0.215

0.316*

0.137

0.234

0.087

0.036

0.251

0.02

AES-C

0.260*

0.131

0.265*

0.226

0.143

0.226

0.103

0.153

0.1

HVLT-R

-0.218

0.137

-0.232

-0.347*

0.149

-0.362*

-0.36*

0.160

-0.4*

Age

-0.002

0.012

-0.020

-0.023+

0.013

-0.266+

-0.03+

0.014

-0.3+

Gender

-0.55*

0.257

-0.28*

0.069

0.280

0.035

0.018

0.300

0.01

Education

0.06

0.055

0.141

0.007

0.060

0.015

0.076

0.065

0.17

CB

-0.24+

0.139

-0.25+

-0.279+

0.151

-0.284+

-0.41*

0.162

-0.4*

UHDRS

-0.07

0.193

-0.08

-0.084

0.210

-0.086

0.02

0.23

0.02

Main Predictors are italicized; * p<.05; + p<.1; Uns. Task = Unstructured Task Total Points
Standard Score; Stroop Int.=Stroop Interference Scores; HVLT-R=HVLT-R Recognition Scores;
CB= Caregiver Burden; UHDRS=UHDRS Motor scores

Metacognitive Knowledge: Apathy. There were positive relationships of the
Metacognitive Knowledge of Apathy with both the Stroop interference score (positive
relationship predicated) and AES-C total score (negative relationship predicted). The
Unstructured Task total scores coefficient was no longer significant when motor scores were
included in the model. The coefficients for the Stroop and AES-C were not significantly different
from each other, Wald Test χ2 (1)=0.774, p=0.38.
Metacognitive Knowledge: Executive Dysfunction. The HVLT-R was negatively
associated with the discrepancy score for Metacognitive Knowledge of Executive Dysfunction
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(positive association predicted). There was a trending, positive relationship between the
Metacognitive Knowledge Executive Dysfunction score and the Unstructured Task (positive
relationship predicated).
Metacognitive Knowledge: Memory. The Metacognitive Knowledge Memory score was
only associated with the HVLT-R (negative relationship) recognition predictor variable (positive
relationship was predicted).

Figure 5. Multivariate Multiple Regression Results.
Black indicates significant path, Blue indicates non-significant path. Standardized coefficients
are reported in the figures.
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Exploratory Analyses of Metacognitive Knowledge
In examining the results of the multivariate multiple regression, it appears that the
statistic was underpowered as several variables that were not significant in the simple
correlational analyses (See Appendix E) became significant in the regression, indicating possible
suppressor effects. Another difficulty is in the interpretation of difference scores in the regression
analysis. When examining individuals’ difference scores, negative scores indicate that the
informant rated the symptom more severely than the patient. Positive difference scores indicate
that the patient rated the symptom more severely than the informant. Because of this, a positive
relationship between the discrepancy scores and cognition does not necessarily indicate better
cognition with better awareness, nor does a negative relationship indicate worse awareness with
worse cognition (or the opposite with Apathy). For example, a positive relationship between the
Stroop and Awareness of Apathy does not necessarily indicate that better awareness is associated
with Stroop performance. It could alternatively indicate that for those with high informant ratings
(negative difference scores), better Stroop scores could indicate better awareness. However,
those with high patient ratings, the patients with the best Stroop performance are actually
overestimating their symptom severity relative to the informant. There may also be a
relationship only when informants are rating the patient more severely, but not when the patients
are providing more severe ratings. While the correlational analyses can be further examined via
scatter plot to determine the nature of these relationships, significant regression coefficients
indicate that there is some kind of relationship between the variables, but the nature of the
relationship is difficult to determine.
Given the null correlational results and use of difference scores, the regression is difficult
to interpret. Addition analyses were conducted to explore Metacognitive Knowledge in
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Huntington’s disease to circumvent this issue with difference scores. These analyses provided
interesting results that align with the expected hypotheses and past work in this area.
Exploratory analysis: Comparing patient and informant ratings (49 participants).
Mean Apathy outcome (Patient: M=71.67, SD=19.15; Informant: M=87.96, SD=19.36) and
Executive Dysfunction outcome (Patient: M=73.8, SD=17.35; Informant: M=75.67, SD=15.99)
group scores based on FrSBe subscales were above clinical cut-offs (T=65) for both patient and
informant ratings. The mean patient EMQ-R score was 24.16 (16.23), while the mean informant
EMQ-R score was 20.7 (13.96). Paired t-tests were used to examine if there were mean
differences in ratings of Apathy, Executive Dysfunction, and Memory between patient and
informant groups. The mean Apathy informant rating was significantly higher than the mean
patient Apathy rating, t(48)=5.35, p<.001. There were no significant mean differences between
patient and informant ratings of Executive Dysfunction or Memory.
Further analysis was completed to determine if the differences between patient and
informant report varied as a function of symptom severity. Splitting the sample based on motor
score severity was initially considered given motor scores could represent disease severity.
However, 48% of the patients were on medication to control movements, which could impact
their motor scores. Therefore, one set of analyses was conducted using informant ratings to split
the sample and a second set of analyses was conducted using the MoCA scores to split the
sample based on overall cognitive functioning.
Informant ratings for Apathy, Executive Dysfunction and Memory were divided into
tertiles. The bottom tertile represented lower informant rated symptom severity while the top
represented the highest informant rated symptom severity. Differences between patient and
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informant ratings were analyzed across these tertiles using a 2 (patient/informant report) X 3
(tertiles 1 through 3) mixed model analysis of variance.
Apathy. The results revealed a two-way interaction between type of report and group,
F(2, 46) = 11.36, p< .001, with main effects for tertile group, F(2, 46)= 19.2, p<.001 and report
type F(1, 46)=42.53, p<.001. In post-hoc analysis, there was no significant difference between
the patient and informants for the lowest Apathy group, however, informants rated Apathy
significantly higher than the patients for the middle t(15) = 4.786, p<. 001 and most severe
groups t(15)=6.192, p<.001 (See Figure 6). Differences in predictor variable values were
examined between top and bottom groups using independent samples t-tests. There was a
significant difference between total AES-C scores t(21)=2.18, p<.05 with the bottom group
(lowest Apathy) (M=42.24, SD=12.89) having lower clinician rated Apathy than the top group
(highest Apathy) (M=50.88, SD=9.51). There was also a significant difference in Stroop
performance t(31)=2.3, p<.05, with the top group (highest Apathy) (M=46.31, SD=3.07)
performing worse than the bottom group (lowest Apathy) (M=50.29, SD=6.22).
Executive Dysfunction. The results revealed a two-way interaction between type of report
and tertile group, F(2, 46) = 9.06, p<.001, with a main effect for tertile group, F(2, 46)= 16.28,
p<.001. Post-hoc analysis revealed that for the lowest informant-rated symptom group – patients
rated their Executive Dysfunction more severely than the informants t(15)=2.522, p<.05. The
middle tertile group was in agreement. For the top group (highest Executive Dysfunction),
informants provided more severe ratings compared to the patients t(18)= 3.08, p<.01 (See Figure
7). When examining differences in predictor variables between the top and bottom groups, the
top group (most informant-rated Executive Dysfunction) performed significantly worse on TMTB, t(33)=2.3, p<.05 (T-scores Top M=19.86, SD=9.31; Bottom M=35.68, SD=17) and the
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Unstructured Task t(33)=2.1, p<.05 (z-scores Top M=-1.71, SD=.57; Bottom M=-1.25, SD=.75).
There was significantly lower Apathy for the bottom group t(33)=2.73, p<.01 (top: M=48.21,
SD=7.97; bottom: M=39.31, SD=11.29).
Memory. The results revealed a significant two-way interaction between report type and
tertile group, F(2, 47)= 11.82, p<.001 with a significant main effects for tertile group, F(2,
47)=15.17, p<.001. Patient ratings were significantly higher than informant ratings for the
bottom group (lowest informant-rated memory issues), t(14)=4.96, p<.001 and middle groups,
t(17)=2.03, p<.05, while informant ratings were higher than the patients’ in the top group
(highest informant-rated memory issues), t(16)=2.317, p<.05 (See Figure 8). When comparing
predictor variables between top and bottom groups, the top group demonstrated poorer
performance on the Stroop, t(30)=3.3, p<.01 (top – M=44.94, SD=4.99; bottom - M=51.72,
SD=6.54) and had significantly worse clinician rated Apathy (AES-C), t(30)=2.86, p<.01 (top M=48.47, SD=11.46; bottom - M=37.73, SD=9.56).
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Figure 6. Mean informant and patient ratings of Apathy based on informant rating tertiles.
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Figure 7. Mean informant and patient ratings of Executive Dysfunction based on informant
rating tertiles.
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Figure 8. Mean informant and patient ratings of Memory based on informant rating tertiles.

!

57

Exploratory analysis: Examining patient and informant agreement based on overall
cognitive impairment using the MoCA. The sample was split into thirds based on MoCA
Standard Scores. The Top group had the highest (best) MoCA standard scores (N=16; Mean:
.5887, SD=.42), while the bottom group had the lowest (worst) scores (N=13; Mean=-2.36,
SD=.8).
For Apathy ratings, there were significant differences in informant and patient ratings for
the bottom two thirds of the sample (bottom, t(15)=7.533, p<.001, middle, t(19)=2.369, p<.05).
There was no difference between patient and informant ratings of Apathy for the best MoCA
performers (See Table 5 and Figure 9). There were no significant differences for any of the
tertile groups between patient and informant report for Executive Dysfunction (See Figure 10).
There were no significant differences for any of the tertile groups between patient and informant
report for memory (See Figure 11).

Table 5. Apathy ratings for groups based on MoCA scores.

Patient Mean
Informant Mean

!

Bottom
t(15)=7.533, p<.001
64.38 (SD=16.63)
92.38 (SD=13.09)

Middle
t(19)=2.369, p<.05
78 (SD=17.04)
89.65 (SD=23.1)
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Top
ns
70.92 (SD=22.87)
79.92 (SD=18.42)
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Figure 9. Informant and patient ratings of Apathy based on patient performance on the MoCA.
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Figure 10. Informant and patient ratings of Executive Dysfunction based on patient performance
on the MoCA.
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Figure 11. Informant and patient ratings of Memory based on patient performance on the
MoCA.

Exploratory analysis of Metacognitive Knowledge: Associations between
cognitive performance and self-report ratings (49 participants). Patient self-reported
memory was negatively associated with delayed memory performance, recognition memory, and
percent retention, therefore worse self-reported memory was associated with lower actual
memory performance on cognitive testing. Informant report of the patients’ Memory was only
negatively associated with delayed memory. Informant report of the patients’ Executive
Dysfunction was negatively associated with performance on executive function tasks (i.e.,
Unstructured Task, Trail Making Test, and Stroop Test) while there was no association between
patient ratings of Executive Dysfunction and executive function performance (See Table 6).
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Additionally, when examining patient and informant report of Apathy, only informant report was
related to cognitive performance on executive functioning tasks (TMT-B standard score (r=-.322,
p<.05); Stroop CW Standard (r=-.351, p<.05).

Table 6. The Relationship Between Patient and Informant Reports and Neuropsychological Test
Results.
Memory – Everyday Memory Questionnaire
Neuropsych Task
Patient Report
Informant Report
HVLT-R Immediate Trials
ns
ns
HVLT-R Delay
r=-.292, p<.05 (Raw)
r=-.26, p=.066 (Raw)
r=-.311, p<.05 (T Score)
r=-.29, p<.05 (T Score)
HVLT-R Recognition
r=-.459, p<.001 (Raw)
ns
r=-408, p<.01 (T Score)
Percent Retention
r=-.289, p<.05 (Raw)
ns (Raw)
r=-.398, p<.01 (T Score)
r=-.27, p=.06 (T Score)
Executive Function- FrSBe Executive Dysfunction Subscale
Neuropsych Task
Patient Report
Informant Report
Unstructured Task Points (z)
ns
r=-.328, p=.05
Stroop Color-Word
ns
r=-.475, p<.001
Stroop Interference
ns
r=-.346, p=.05
TMT B Time
ns
r=-.361, p<.05
TMT B Standard Score
r=-.321, p<.05
r=-.426, p<.01
TMT B-A (z)
ns
r=-.26, p=.071
TMT B/A Ratio (z)
ns
ns
Apathy – FrSBe Apathy Subscale
Neuropsych Task
Patient Report
Informant Report
Stroop Color-Word
ns
r=-.351, p<.05
TMT B Standard Score
ns
r=-.322, p<.05
ns=not significant; standard scores reported except where indicated; z=z-score.

Hypothesis Two - Anticipatory Awareness
(1) Cognitive Executive Functioning, clinician-rated Apathy, and cognitive Memory will
be independently associated with Anticipatory Awareness of Executive Functioning and Memory
as measured by performance prediction on tasks of everyday functioning. (2) Executive
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Functioning and Memory will be positively associated with Anticipatory Awareness while
Apathy will be negatively associated. (3) Apathy and Executive Dysfunction will have stronger
relationships with Anticipatory Awareness than Memory.

Validity Check for Performance Prediction (Anticipatory Awareness) and
Evaluation (Emergent Awareness) Rating Method
To demonstrate that patients’ ratings on the bell curve were consistent with their beliefs
(i.e Anticipatory and Emergent Awareness), patients were asked to provide a verbal indicator of
their performance (i.e. average, above average, or below average) in addition to a percentile
rating.

Table 7. Kendall’s Tau Correlations: Verbal statement of ratings and percentile ratings using the
bell curve method.
NAB Task

Performance Prediction
Rating /Anticipatory
Awareness
.847**
.765**

Performance Evaluation
Rating/ Emergent
Awareness
.743**
.793**

.756**

.660**

Delay Memory

.731**

.704**

Recognition Memory
Address
Immediate Memory

.773**

.802**

.799**

.679**

Delay Memory

.717**

.687**

Recognition Memory
** indicates p<.0001

.797**

.834**

Driving
Judgment
Medication
Immediate Memory
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Patients’ verbal ratings of their performance were strongly correlated with their percentile
ratings for all NAB tasks, suggesting that patient’s ratings were consistent with their beliefs of
performance (see Table 7).

Main Proposed Analysis for Hypothesis Two
A multivariate multiple regression approach using a path analysis framework was used to
explore the hypothesis. The outcome variables were the memory and executive function
Anticipatory Awareness factor scores which were calculated by subtracting the patient ratings
from the actual performance percentile for each NAB task and/or subtask (See Appendix F for
information on the creation of factor scores). The Unstructured Task total points, Stroop
Interference score, HVLT-R Recognition Score and AES-C score were the predictor variables.
The regression analysis controlled for age, education, gender, and UHDRS motor score.
Correlations between predictor and outcome variables were analyzed (See Appendix F for a full
report of correlational analyses).
Regression assumptions and diagnostics. Tests of multivariate normality suggested that
the residuals for the model did not statistically deviate from multivariate normality, B1p=1.87,
X2(20)=18.18, p=0.58, B2p=24.81, zupper=.43, zlower=-0.74. One multivariate outlier was
identified. Regression assumptions were also examined for each OLS regression model.
Examination of scatterplots of the standardized residuals and the standardized predicted values
suggested that the assumptions of random errors and linearity were met. The Watson and Durbin
test indicated that residuals were independent (values=2.12, 2.14). Examination of a histogram of
the residuals indicated that the residuals were normally distributed, however, an issue related to
homoscedasticity was noted for a few data points. Examination of influential data points revealed
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large Mahalanobis distance values (>15) for three cases across all 4 OLS regressions. Upon
removal of these cases, scatterplots of the standardized residuals appeared to be a random pattern
of points, suggesting the data met the homogeneity of variance assumption for each separate
OLS model. Additionally, three casewise outliers were identified. Data changed significantly
upon removal of 4 out of the 6 participants that were identified to be casewise outliers or had
large Mahalanobis distance values, suggesting they potentially influenced results. Results were
therefore examined with 51 out of the 55 participants who had data. Similar to the Metacognitive
Knowledge analyses, a potential issue with multicollinearity between the Unstructured Task total
points and UHDRS Motor score was identified (Unstructured Task: Tolerance=.4, VIF=2.49;
Motor Scores: Tolerance =.36, VIF=2.77). Because inclusion or exclusion of UHDRS motor
scores did not change the results of the regression analysis, results with the inclusion of the
UHDRS motor scores are reported.
Anticipatory Awareness: Regression results (51 participants). The Chi-square test of
model fit indicated that the saturated model fit significantly better than the model with regression
coefficients constrained to 0, χ2 (32)=56.599, p<.01. R2 were provided for each individual
regression model for each outcome variable (the Anticipatory Awareness Factor Scores):
Executive Prediction R2=.183 p=.065; Immediate memory prediction R2=.195, p=.052, Delay
Memory Prediction R2=.327, p<.01; Recognition Memory R2= .257, p<.05. There was a
trending, positive relationship with the Executive Anticipatory Awareness Factor Score and the
AES-C, and a significant, positive relationship with the HVLT-R recognition score. The
Immediate Memory Prediction score had a positive relationship with the AES-C and a negative
relationship with the Unstructured Task score.
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There was a trending relationship with the Delay Memory Prediction score and the Stroop
Interference score. See Table 8 and Figure 12 for the complete results.

Table 8. Multivariate Multiple Regression for Memory and Executive Anticipatory Awareness
(Performance Predictions).
Executive

Immediate Memory

Delay Memory

Recognition Memory

Prediction

Prediction

Prediction

Prediction

Est

SE

St.

Est

SE

St.

Est

SE

St

Est.

SE

St.

Uns

0.3

0.3

0.21

-0.7

0.28

-0.56

-0.2

0.271

-0.12

-0.09

0.281

-0.07

Stroop

-0.1

0.2

-0.1

0.13

0.24

0.083

0.4+

0.232

0.2+

0.096

0.242

0.06

AES

0.3+

0.1

0.3+

0.28

0.14

0.276

0.19

0.135

0.18

0.214

0.140

0.2

HVLT

0.5

0.2

0.5

-0.1

0.23

-0.088

-0.2

0.222

-0.22

-0.17

0.224

-0.17

Gender

0.2

0.2

0.16

-0.2

0.33

-0.112

-0.2

0.316

-0.07

-0.21

0.326

-0.10

Motor

0.5+

0.3

0.5+

-0.5+

0.29

-0.51+

-0.7

0.277

-0.64

-0.43

0.289

-0.42

Edu.

0.3+

0.2

0.26

0.14

0.06

0.333

-0.1

0.061

-0.21

0.008

0.063

0.02

0.03+

0.02

0.303+

0.05

0.014

0.57

0.05

0.015

0.53

+
Age

-0.3

0.2

-0.2

Italicized are main DVs, Bolded indicates significance p>05, + indicates trending, Uns=
Unstructured Task total points, Edu=Education
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Not!significant!

Figure 12. Model for Multivariate Multiple Regression Analysis: Anticipatory
Awareness/Performance Prediction.

Black indicates significant path, Blue indicates non-significant path. Standardized coefficients
are reported in the figures.

Hypothesis Three - Emergent Awareness
(1) Cognitive Executive functioning, clinician-rated Apathy, and cognitive Memory will
be independently associated with Emergent Awareness of Executive Functioning and Memory as
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measured by performance evaluation on tasks of everyday functioning. (2) Executive functioning
and Memory will be positively associated with awareness while Apathy will be negatively
associated. (3) Apathy and Executive Dysfunction will be greater contributing factors to
Emergent Awareness in HD than Memory.

Main Proposed Analyses of Hypothesis Three
A multivariate multiple regression approach using a path analysis framework was used to
explore the hypothesis. The outcome variables were the immediate, delay, and recognition
memory and executive function evaluation factor scores which were calculated by subtracting
the patient ratings from the actual performance percentile for each NAB task and/or subtask. The
Unstructured Task total points, Stroop interference score, HVLT-R Recognition Score and AESC score were the predictor variables. The regression model controlled for age, education, gender,
and UHDRS motor score.
Regression assumptions and diagnostics. Tests of multivariate normality suggests the
residuals for the model do statistically deviate from multivariate normality B1p=2.14,
X2(20)=20.74, p=0.43, B2p=23.23, zupper=-.41, zlower=-1.57. One multivariate outlier was
identified. Examination of a histogram of the residuals indicated that the residuals are normally
distributed. Examination of scatter plots of residuals indicated that the assumption of
homoscedasticity has been met. Examination of influential data points revealed large
Mahalanobis distance values for three cases across all 4 OLS regressions. One of these data
points was the same point identified as a multivariate outlier. Additionally, seven casewise
outliers were identified across the OLS regressions. The results did not change with the removal
of these individuals from the data set. Data is reported with all data points included. Similar to
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the previous analyses, a potential issue with multicollinearity between the Unstructured Task
total points and UHDRS Motor score was identified (Unstructured Task: Tolerance=.4,
VIF=2.49; Motor scores Tolerance =.36, VIF=2.77). Because the inclusion or exclusion of
UHDRS Motor scores did not change the results of the regression analysis, results with the
inclusion of the UHDRS Motor scores are reported, especially since UHDRS Motor scores were
a significant predictor for some of the outcome variables. The Durbin-Watson statistic (values
range from 2.09-2.28), which tests the independence of errors assumption, was in the acceptable
range.

Table 9. Multivariate Multiple Regression Analysis: Emergent Awareness (45 Participants).
Executive

Immediate Memory

Delay Memory

Recognition Memory

Evaluation

Evaluation

Evaluation

Evaluation

Est

SE

St.

Est

SE

St

Est.

SE

St.

Uns.

-0.341

0.257

-0.256

-0.242

0.236

-0.183

-0.136

0.239

-0.1

Stroop

-0.169

0.239

-0.103

0.120

0.219

0.074

0.117

0.223

0.07

AES-C

0.311*

0.134

0.30*

0.172

0.123

0.166

0.382*

0.125

0.4*

HVLTR

0.147

0.168

0.138

-0.132

0.156

-0.125

-0.083

0.156

-0.1

Gender

-0.042

0.062

0.084

-0.261

0.261

-0.128

0.318

0.266

0.15

Total Motor

-0.279

0.196

-0.279

-0.48*

0.183

-0.48*

-0.319

0.183

-0.3

Education

0.173

0.285

-0.098

-0.10+

0.057

-0.2+

0.059

1.025

0.13

Age

0.015

0.013

0.168

0.043*

0.012

0.48*

0.043*

0.012

0.5*

Italicized are main DVs, Bolded indicates significance p>05, + indicates trending
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Emergent Awareness/Performance Evaluation: Regression results. The Chi-square
test of model fit indicated that the saturated model did significantly fit better than the model with
regression coefficients constrained to 0, χ2 (32)=49.278, p<.05. R2 were provided for each
individual regression model: Executive Evaluation, R2= not significant. Immediate Memory
R2=.178, p=.057; Delay Memory R2=.309, p<.01; Recognition Memory R2=.287, p<.01.
Regarding the primary predictors, only the AES-C had positive relationships with the Immediate
and Recognition Memory Evaluation discrepancy scores. When regression was attempted with
Driving or Judgment Emergent Awareness score alone rather than combined into a factor score,
neither of those regressions were significant. See Table 9 and Figure 13 for complete results.

Not significant

Figure 13. Model for Multivariate Multiple Regression Analysis: Emergent Awareness/
Performance Evaluation.
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Exploratory Analyses for Online Awareness
Similar to Hypothesis 1, the proposed analyses to test the Online Awareness Hypotheses
(Hypotheses 2 and 3) was to use a multivariate multiple regression approach. Initial correlational
analyses, however, did not reveal any convincing relationships among the predictor and outcome
variables. The multivariate multiple regression was underpowered and suppression effects also
arose, making the regression analysis difficult to interpret. Furthermore, difference scores make
it difficult to interpret the nature of the relationships observed. Additional analyses were
conducted to further explore Online Awareness in HD.

Exploratory analysis: Relationships between patient ratings and actual
performance. Patients’ predictions of executive performance (i.e. Judgment and Driving tasks)
were unrelated to actual performance, while memory predictions (i.e. Medication and Address
Memory) were related to performance (Anticipatory Awareness). Memory evaluation was more
strongly associated with performance than executive function evaluation (Emergent Awareness)
(see Table 10).
Exploratory analysis: Differences between Prediction ratings (Anticipatory
Awareness), Evaluation ratings (Emergent Awareness) and actual performance.
Paired-samples t-tests were used to examine if there were mean differences in performance on
the NAB memory and executive function tasks and the patients’ performance prediction ratings
for the tasks. For all NAB tasks, mean predictions were significantly higher than actual
performance (all differences p<.001).
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Table 10. Relationship between performance prediction (Anticipatory Awareness) and
evaluation (Emergent Awareness) percentile ratings and actual performance.
NAB Task:

Performance Evaluation

Judgment

Performance
Prediction
ns

Driving

ns

ns

Medication Memory Immediate

ns

r=.415, p<.01

Medication Memory Delay

r=.274, p<.05

r=.337, p<.05

ns

Medication Memory Recognition r=.257, p=.058

r=.288, p<.05

Address Memory Immediate

ns

r=.552, p<.001

Address Memory Delayed

r=.512, p<.001

r=.594, p<.001

Address Memory Recognition

r=.338, p<.05

r=.452, p<.001

When examining differences between performance prediction and evaluation ratings, on average,
participants’ evaluations of performance were higher than their predictions for the Judgment,
Driving and Address Memory Recognition tasks. Their evaluations were lower for the
Medication Immediate Memory and Medication Memory Recognition Tasks (See Figure 14).
Exploratory analyses were conducted to examine differences among actual performance
and predictions and evaluations. Participants were separated into tertile groups based on actual
performance. The Bottom group represented the worst performers, while the Top group
represented the best performers. Differences were analyzed across these tertiles using a 3 (Score:
actual performance, prediction rating, and evaluation rating) X 3 (Tertiles: 1 through 3) mixed
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model analysis of variance with special attention to interaction effects to determine if differences
in discrepancies between performance and ratings depended on how well individuals performed
on the task. Afterward, additional exploratory analyses were conducted to examine group
differences in discrepancy scores between prediction scores (Anticipatory Awareness) and actual
performance. The procedure was also completed for evaluation scores (Emergent Awareness).
This method has been used to examine the Dunning-Kruger effect to examine if low performers
are worse at predicting performance than high performers (Dunning, Johnson, Ehrlinger, &
Kruger, 2003; Kruger & Dunning, 1999). Given the exploratory nature of this analysis only
differences between the bottom and top tertiles were explored to reduce the number of
comparisons made.
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Figure 14. Performance Prediction and Evaluation Ratings and Actual Performance.
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NAB Judgment. The results revealed a two-way interaction between score and group, F(4,
104) = 15.7, p< .001, with main effects for tertile group, F(2, 52)= 18.41, p<.001 and report type
F(2, 104)=28.74, p<.001. Analyses of discrepancies between actual performance and ratings
revealed significant differences in prediction discrepancies, (Top M=15.22, SD=22; Bottom M=34.6, SD=25.1), t(34)=6.32, p<.001 and evaluation discrepancies, (Top M=22.6, SD=19.9;
Bottom M=-37.37, SD=28.1) t(34)=7.381, p<.001 between top and bottom groups. The topperforming group underestimated their performance while the bottom group overestimated
performance (See Figure 15). There were no differences in predictor variable scores between the
top and bottom groups.
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Figure 15. Patient ratings of Judgment and actual performance by tertile group based on actual
performance.
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NAB Driving. The results revealed a two-way interaction between score and group, F(4,
102) = 3.12, p< .05, with main effects for tertile group, F(2, 51)= 4.28, p<.05 and score F(2,
102)=72.23, p<.001.
There were significant differences between the top and bottom performing groups for
both prediction discrepancies t(39)=2.82, p<.01 and evaluation discrepancies t(39)=2.32, p<.05.
Both groups overestimated their performance, but there were larger discrepancies between
patient ratings and their actual performance for the lowest performers compared with the top
performers (Prediction Means: Top M=-14.9, SD=28.1; Bottom M=-37.2, SD=22.7) (Evaluation
Means: Top M=-25.47, SD=19.8) (See Figure 16). When examining mean group differences
between top and bottom performers, the top performers also had significantly better HVLT-R
Recognition scores, (Top M=8.89, SD=2.4; Bottom M=5.14, SD=2.23), t(39)=5.192, p<.001,
TMT-B Standard Scores, (Top M=37.6, SD=12.9; Bottom M=21.74, SD=11.28), t(39)=4.2,
p<.001, Unstructured Task Scores, (Top M=-1, SD=.78; Bottom M=-1.8, SD=.53), t(39)=3.9,
p<.001, and significantly lower Apathy (AES-C), (Top M=42.2, SD=12.75; Bottom M=50.64,
SD=7.4), t(39)=2.32, p<.05.
NAB Immediate Memory Medications. The results revealed a two-way interaction
between score and group, F(4, 102) = 6.88, p< .001, with main effects for tertile group, F(2, 51)=
12.97, p<.001 and score F(2, 102)=21.7, p<.001.However, there were no significant differences
in performance prediction or evaluation discrepancy scores between the top and bottom
performing groups.
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Figure 16. Patient ratings of Driving and actual performance by tertile group based on actual
performance.
NAB Delay Memory Medications. The mixed model analysis did not reveal any
interaction effects. There were main effects for tertile group, F(2, 51)= 12.39, p<.001 and score
F(2, 102)=21, p<.001. There were no significant differences between the lower and upper tertile
groups for prediction or evaluation discrepancy scores of delay memory for medications.
NAB Recognition Memory Medications. The mixed model analysis did not reveal any
interaction effects. There were main effects for tertile group, F(2, 52)= 11.14, p<.001 and score
F(2, 104)=42.85, p<.001.
There was no significant difference in tertile groups for prediction or evaluation
discrepancy ratings of recognition memory for medications.
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NAB Immediate Memory Address. The results revealed a two-way interaction between
score and group, F(4, 104) = 6.38, p< .001, with main effects for tertile group, F(2, 51)= 14.25,
p<.001 and score F(2, 104)=19.76, p<.001.
There was a difference in discrepancy scores for prediction of immediate memory
(address) between top (M=-6.9, SD=18.2) and bottom performing groups (M=-10.5, SD=16.3),
t(33)=2.74, p<.01 with a larger overestimations of performance by the bottom performing group
(See Figure 17). There was no significant difference for evaluation discrepancies. Regarding
differences in predictors between the top and bottom groups, there top group had significantly
better performance on TMT-B Standard Scores, (Top M=35, SD=9.8; Bottom M=21.3, SD=15),
t(33)=3.268, p<.01, HVLT-R Recognition scores, (Top M=8.3, SD=2.9; Bottom M=5.9,
SD=2.7), t(33)=2.5, p<.05, Stroop Interference, (Top M=50.7, SD=5; Bottom M=46.5, SD=4.9),
t(33)=2.49, p<.05, and Unstructured Task, (Top M=-1, SD=.77; Bottom M=-1.7, SD=.68),
t(33)=2.83, p<.01.
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Figure 17. Patient ratings of Immediate Memory for Address and actual performance by tertile
group based on actual performance.
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NAB Delay Memory Address. The mixed model analysis did not reveal any interaction
effects. There were main effects for tertile group, F(2, 51)= 31.88, p<.001 and score F(2,
102)=18.55, p<.001.
There were no differences in delay memory (address) prediction or evaluation discrepancies
between the upper and lower tertile groups.
NAB Recognition Memory Address. The results revealed a two-way interaction between
score and group, F(4, 104) = 2.61, p< .05, with main effects for tertile group, F(2, 52)= 17.79,
p<.001 and score F(2, 104)=49.8, p<.001.
There was a significant difference in prediction discrepancies between top and bottom
performing groups, with the bottom (M=-35.22, SD=24) group providing a larger overestimation
of performance than the top group (M=-11.65, SD=22.6), t(36)=3.1, p<.01. There was no
difference in evaluation discrepancy scores (See Figure 18). There were also significant
differences in predictor variables with the top performance group also performing better on the
HVLT-R Recognition scores, (Top M=9.4, SD=1.8; Bottom M=5.2, SD=3.2), t(36)=5.12,
p<.001, TMT-B Standard Score, (Top M=35.5, SD=13.2; Bottom M=20.2, SD=10.4),
t(36)=3.95, p<.001, and the Unstructured task, (Top M=-1, SD=.79; Bottom M=-1.9, SD=.46),
t(36)=4.05, p<.001.

Exploratory Analysis: Metacognitive Knowledge and Online Awareness
There were no relationships between Metacognitive Knowledge discrepancy scores (FrSBe and
EMQ-R) and Online Awareness discrepancy scores.

!

77

Recognition Memory - Address
80
70

Percentile

60
50
40
Actual Score

30
20

Predicted Rating

10

Evaluation Rating

0
Bottom

Second

Third

Actual Performance

Figure 18. Patient ratings of Recognition Memory for Address and actual performance by tertile
group based on actual performance.
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CHAPTER FOUR:
DISCUSSION

The purpose of this study was to explore cognitive (i.e. Executive Functioning and
Memory) and emotional factors (i.e. Apathy) and their relationships with Metacognitive
Knowledge and Online Awareness in symptomatic HD. Metacognitive Awareness of Apathy,
Executive Dysfunction, and Memory and Online Awareness of Executive Dysfunction and
Memory were specifically examined. This was an exploratory study; there have been no other
studies to date that examined factors that may be associated with the development of
unawareness in Huntington’s disease. It was also unclear from previous research if unawareness,
or anosognosia, is global or domain-specific in this population. It is also the first known study in
HD to examine Online Awareness using a performance prediction and evaluation technique in
addition to self/informant report discrepancies to study Metacognitive Knowledge.

Metacognitive Knowledge in HD
Metacognitive Knowledge is the overall beliefs about one’s own abilities or self (Toglia
& Kirk, 2000). Metacognitive Knowledge of Apathy, Executive Dysfunction, and Memory was
measured with discrepancies between patient and informant report in these domains. It was
hypothesized that Apathy, Executive Functioning, and Memory would independently be related
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to Metacognitive Knowledge. Apathy and Executive Functioning would be more strongly related
to Metacognitive Knowledge than Memory (Hypothesis One).
The proposed analysis to test this hypothesis was to use a multivariate multiple regression
approach to examine these relationships. Initial simple correlational analyses of the
Metacognitive Knowledge difference score outcome variables and the predictor variables
revealed some relationships including Metacognitive Knowledge of Apathy and self-monitoring
(Unstructured Task) and inhibition (Stroop Interference) as well as a relationship between
Metacognitive Knowledge of Executive Dysfunction and inhibition (Stroop Interference).
Graphical exploration of these findings indicated that a few participants’ scores drove the Stroop
relationships, so it may not be appropriate to draw conclusions about these relationships. The
relationship between Metacognitive Knowledge of Apathy and the Unstructured Task score
suggests that initially, as performance on the Unstructured Task improves, informants and
patients are in better agreement. However, scores between the patients and informants tend to
diverge as the Unstructured task score continues to improve, with the patients rating their Apathy
more severely than the informants. This provides some evidence that executive functioning is
associated with Metacognitive Knowledge and partially supports the hypothesis that this
cognitive function is associated with awareness in HD.

Is Metacognitive Knowledge Domain Specific?
It appears that the regression statistic was underpowered as several variables that were
not significant in the simple correlational analyses became significant in the regression,
indicating possible suppressor effects. Additionally, the use of difference scores in the regression
caused the results to be even more difficult to interpret (as explained in the results section of this
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paper). Therefore, further exploratory analyses were conducted to further examine the
hypotheses.
When examining overall group means, informants provided higher ratings of Apathy than
patients, however, there were no differences between patient and informant ratings of Executive
Dysfunction and Memory. Notably, the HD patients on average rated their own Apathy and
Executive Dysfunction above clinical cut-offs, suggesting they may have some awareness of
these issues. No clinical cut-offs for the EMQ-R exist, so this could not be explored.
Further analysis was conducted to determine if group differences appeared when
examining discrepancies between patient and informant report based on informant-rated
symptom severity. Patients with the lowest informant-rated Apathy were in agreement with the
informants, while those with the highest informant-rated Apathy underestimated their ratings
compared to their informants. For Memory and Executive Dysfunction, the bottom tertile patient
group rated their cognitive problems as more significant than their informants. Only for those
with the highest informant-rated memory problems and executive dysfunction were the patient
ratings lower than informant ratings. This suggests that these patients underestimated their
cognitive issues compared to the informants. Overall, the results indicated that those with the
most Apathy and Executive Dysfunction, and Memory problems according to informants were
most unaware of their symptoms, supporting the hypothesis that there is an association with
worsening apathy, memory and executive functioning and Metacognitive Knowledge.
To further explore the hypothesis that apathy, executive functioning and memory would
be associated with Metacognitive Knowledge, comparisons were made between the top and
bottom tertile groups since it was established that patients in the top tertile group underestimated
their problems while those in the bottom group either agreed with their informant or
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overestimated their problems. When comparing mean predictor variables between these groups,
those who were most unaware of their Apathy also had the lowest scores on the Stroop
Interference and TMT-B (both executive functioning tasks) and highest AES-C score (indicating
more severe clinician-rated Apathy). Similarly, when comparing groups based on informant
Executive Dysfunction ratings, there were differences between the highest and lowest groups for
the executive functioning and clinician-rated apathy measure. Finally, when comparing groups
based on informant memory ratings, there were significant differences in clinician-rated Apathy
and Stroop scores. These results provide more evidence that Executive Functioning and Apathy
may be associated with Metacognitive Knowledge in HD, while there is less evidence for the
relationship between Memory and Metacognitive Knowledge.
A caveat of using the informants as the standard to create the tertile groups is that this
may not be an accurate method to measure unawareness. There were almost no differences in
ratings of apathy, executive functioning, among the patient tertile groups. While this may be
because the patients are unaware, it may also be because of an unrelated, statistical problem.
When creating groups based on informant scores, the informant scores may have more of a range
between tertile groups than the patients. Therefore for the highest and lowest informant-rated
groups, statistically, patients will most always overestimate compared to informants when
informants are rating them low and underestimate when informants are rating themselves higher.
Because of this caveat, the same analyses were conducted by splitting the sample into
groups based on MoCA score severity, as the MoCA provides an indication of overall cognitive
dysfunction. Again, patients with the least overall cognitive impairment were in agreement with
informants on their Apathy ratings, however, those with more cognitive impairment
underestimated the severity of their Apathy relative to the informants. Patients and informants
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were in agreement across severity groups for Executive Dysfunction and Memory scores.
Perhaps this suggests that overall cognitive dysfunction is not enough to produce unawareness
and there are specific domains of cognitive dysfunction that may be more predictive of the
development of unawareness.
The results support other research that has proposed that self-monitoring is an avenue
through which failures are recognized and is thus important for awareness. Executive functioning
may also impact memory, which can then impact awareness, as executive functioning is required
for the retrieval of relevant autobiographical memories (Morris & Mograbi, 2013; Robertson,
2010). Performance on the Unstructured task and Stroop test have been shown to associated with
ventromedial prefrontal cortex activity, an area of the brain also associated with self-reflection,
evaluation, recollection inhibition and self-monitoring (Leung, Skudlarski, Gatenby, Peterson, &
Gore, 2000; Potenza et al., 2003; Robinson et al., 2014). The findings are consistent with studies
that suggest that awareness is associated with the ability to detect errors, which may explain HD
difficulty providing accurate ratings as HD patients have been shown to have reduced error
processing (Beste et al., 2006; Clare, 2002; Hannesdottir Metacognitive & Morris, 2007). The
results also support the theory that apathy may be associated with Knowledge, as emotion tags
significance or relevance to events, which is important in the ability to recognize failures.

Patient and Informant Report Compared with Objective Cognitive Measures
The relationship between patient and informant report and the patients’ actual cognitive
functioning was also examined. While not directly testing the hypotheses, this analysis was
important to determine if awareness is domain specific and also allowed the exploration of
Metacognitive Knowledge with objective, cognitive measures. The HD patients’ report of

!

83

Memory was correlated with performance on memory measures while only informant report of
Executive Dysfunction was associated with performance on executive functioning measures.
Similarly, informant Apathy ratings were associated with executive functioning task
performance, while patient ratings were not. This suggests that HD patients may have a better
appreciation of their memory functioning versus their Executive Dysfunction and Apathy. Also,
as a group, the HD patients may be more aware of changes in memory than informants.
There are several possible explanations for these results. According to research of the
Dunning-Kruger effect, those who are most unskilled in a particular ability are the least able to
evaluate their ability in that skill (Dunning et al., 2003; Kruger & Dunning, 1999). Given
research that has shown significant executive functioning deficits and increased apathy in HD,
HD patients may not be able to evaluate themselves in these domains because they suffer from
deficits in the domains. In contrast, past research suggests a relative sparing of memory
functioning in HD compared to other neurodegenerative disorders, particularly Alzheimer’s
disease (Fine et al., 2008). In HD, memory problems are characterized by memory retrieval
deficits, with relative sparing of memory retention (Massman, Delis, Butters, Levin, & Salmon,
1990). Because memory retention is spared in HD, HD patients may be better equipped to
evaluate their functioning within this domain. Differences in anosognosia of memory have been
shown across neurodegenerative disorders depending on the severity of memory impairment
associated with the disorder. For example, while both AD and vascular dementia patients
demonstrate worse awareness of memory than controls, vascular dementia patients had a better
awareness of their memory abilities than AD patients (Morris et al., 2014). Research has shown
that vascular dementia patients have less memory impairment than AD patients (Looi &
Sachdev, 1999), which may explain the difference in awareness for memory impairment between
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groups. It is possible that memory may not contribute to Metacognitive Knowledge in HD,
except for those who are in most advanced stages of the disease when overall brain functioning
declines. This supports the hypothesis that problems with executive functioning and apathy may
be particularly important for the development of unawareness in HD.
Another explanation is perhaps informants do not detect subtle memory changes that
patients may notice themselves. Hannesdottir and Morris (2007) proposed that self-report relies
on a person’s ability to review accumulated information that was gathered over a period of time.
This would also be true for the informants. In a study comparing MCI and older healthy controls’
awareness of memory abilities, the MCI group was more accurate than the control group in their
self-ratings of verbal memory, which suggests that those experiencing “preclinical” memory
impairment are more accurate in evaluating memory than controls (Cook & Marsiske, 2006).
This is consistent with findings in the current study, in that those with relatively more subtle
changes in memory reported more concerns with memory than the informants.
Another explanation may be about general beliefs and attitudes towards memory. Studies
suggest that in the general population, there exist stereotypes about poor memory in aging
individuals (Levy, 2003). Furthermore, some suggest that laypeople may not be able to
distinguish among cognitive domains. Schoo, van Zandvoort, Biessels, Kappelle, and Postma
(2013) suggested that individuals might mistakenly believe they have memory problems, when
in fact, their memory failure may actually arise from executive functioning deficits rather than
true memory impairment. Because Executive Dysfunction may impact memory in HD, such as
the failure to use semantic clustering for example (Fine et al., 2008), HD patients may falsely
believe their Executive Dysfunction is actually memory impairment, which may be why the
patients are underreporting Executive Dysfunction. This may indicate that HD patients are aware
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of their cognitive deficits, but they are wrongly attributing their executive dysfunction to
memory problems. Further research may be conducted in different groups to determine if this
pattern of better awareness of memory is specific to HD or if this is a phenomenon that other
groups experience.

Metacognitive Knowledge and Caregiver Burden, Demographic Characteristics,
and Disease Progression
Caregiver Burden. The inclusion of a measure of caregiver burden in this study was an
attempt to control for a potential bias in the informants’ reports. Caregiver burden was negatively
associated with Metacognitive Knowledge of Apathy suggesting that the informants who
provided more severe ratings than the patients were also experiencing the most caregiver burden.
This could mean that unawareness may cause informants to experience more burden, or that
more burdened informants are likely to rate patients’ symptoms more harshly. A recent study has
shown that anosognosia is associated with increased use of support services, increased cost to the
family, and total number of hours of informal care provided by relatives, regardless of dementia
severity (Turró-Garriga et al., 2016), providing some support that anosognosia is associated with
increased burden for the family system.
Gender. Gender was associated with Metacognitive Knowledge of Apathy; males were
less aware of their own Apathy than females. In Parkinson’s disease (PD), one study
demonstrated an interaction between age and gender, where men were more apathetic in the
older PD patient group and females were more apathetic in the younger PD patient group (Meyer
et al., 2015). Further investigation into the relationship may be explored, as there is little research
examining gender effects in anosognosia.
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Age. Age was also negatively associated with Metacognitive Knowledge of Executive
Dysfunction and Memory, suggesting younger patients were more aware of their symptoms than
older patients.
Education. There were no relationships between Metacognitive Knowledge variables
and education.
Motor Scores. Metacognitive Knowledge of Apathy and Executive Dysfunction were
negatively associated with motor symptom severity, providing some evidence that disease
progression is associated with Metacognitive Knowledge.

Metacognitive Knowledge Conclusions
Results partially support the hypotheses; Executive Functioning, specifically inhibition
and self-monitoring, was the most prominent cognitive variable associated with Metacognitive
Knowledge in HD in simple correlational analyses. Executive functioning is thought to
contribute to the overall sense of self and allows one to update self-identity when new
information is presented or when failures occur (Morris & Mograbi, 2013). This is consistent
with past research that shows HD is associated with significant executive functioning decline
(Paulsen, 2011). There is also some evidence that Apathy is associated with Metacognitive
Knowledge in HD in exploratory analyses examining differences between patient groups with
larger or smaller discrepancy ratings with their informants. There is not enough evidence in this
study to show that decline in memory is associated with Metacognitive Knowledge in HD.
Regarding specific domains of Metacognitive Knowledge, patients who were most
severely impaired in a domain tended to be most unaware of symptoms, regardless of domain.
This is consistent with past research that suggests that agreement between patient and informant
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on measures of frontally mediated behaviors tends to worsen with overall disease progression
(Hergert (Blinkoff), Sanchez-Ramos, & Cimino, 2015). The results also suggest that awareness
may be domain specific in HD. HD patients may have better Metacognitive Knowledge of their
Memory than Executive functioning and Apathy. This supports past research that has
demonstrated prominent executive functioning deficits and increased apathy with relatively
spared memory in HD (Paulsen, 2011) and that those who have more deficits in a specific
domain tend to be most unaware of their abilities in that domain (Dunning et al., 2003).

Online Awareness
Online awareness is activated within a specific situation and involves judgments of
abilities related to that specific situation. According to the Toglia and Kirk model of awareness,
Anticipatory Online Awareness is the appraisal of a current situation, while Emergent Online
Awareness is associated with self-monitoring or self-evaluation during a task (Toglia & Kirk,
2000). Online Awareness of Executive Functioning and Memory was explored through
discrepancies between actual performance on tasks found in everyday living and prediction
(Anticipatory Awareness) and evaluation (Emergent Awareness) ratings of performance. Larger
discrepancy scores indicated lower ability to predict or evaluate performance. This study used a
rating approach in which patients were asked to compare their performance to healthy
individuals without HD with similar, age, gender and education by providing a percentile rating
(Rosen et al., 2010; Williamson et al., 2010). It was hypothesized that Apathy, Executive
Functioning, and Memory would be independently associated with Anticipatory (Hypothesis
Two) and Emergent Awareness (Hypothesis Three) of Executive Functioning and Memory and
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that Apathy and Executive Functioning would be more strongly related to Online Awareness
than Memory.

Is Online Awareness Domain Specific?
Similarly to the Metacognitive Knowledge analysis, the proposed analysis to test these
hypotheses was to use a multivariate multiple regression approach to examine these
relationships. Initial correlational analyses, however, did not indicate any convincing
relationships among the predictor and outcome variables. The multivariate multiple regression
was underpowered and suppression effects also arose, making the regression analysis difficult to
interpret. Therefore, exploratory analyses were conducted to further examine Online Awareness.
For the whole sample, mean performance prediction (Anticipatory Awareness) and
evaluation (Emergent Awareness) ratings were significantly higher than actual performance for
all NAB Daily Living tasks. While not a test of the hypotheses, this finding could have
significant implications for daily functioning and safety, as this could mean HD patients may
overestimate their abilities in similar everyday tasks, such as taking their medications and
driving. It also supports past research that HD patients tend to overestimate their performance on
activities of daily living compared to informant report (Hoth et al., 2007). As a group, overall
predictions and evaluations of memory performance were correlated with actual memory
performance while this was not true of the relationships between executive function predictions
and evaluations and actual performance. Similar to the Metacognitive Knowledge that suggested
that HD patients have a better awareness of memory than executive functioning, these results
also suggest that HD patients may have a better Online Awareness of memory than executive
functioning.
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In examining possible differences between those who are more unaware versus aware,
those who performed the worst on each NAB task had the largest discrepancies between actual
performance and prediction and evaluation ratings, suggesting that they had the poorest Online
Awareness. This is consistent with the other studies that have demonstrated the Dunning-Kruger
effect. In healthy populations, top performers tend to provide the best estimates of their
performance compared to the poorer performers. Those who perform the worst on tasks tend to
overestimate actual level of performance. The effect has shown that the poorer the competency
in a domain, the larger discrepancy in the estimation that is given by the performer in that
domain (Kruger & Dunning, 1999, 2009; Schoo et al., 2013). This effect has been demonstrated
in several domains in healthy individuals, including on college exams, and expertise in
professional domains, such as medical technicians knowledge of medical terminology (Dunning
et al., 2003; Ehrlinger, Johnson, Banner, Dunning, & Kruger, 2008). The theory proposes that the
cognitive mechanisms required to do well on those tasks are the same mechanisms required to
estimate performance (Dunning et al., 2003). In this study, those who performed poorly on the
Daily Living Memory NAB tasks, likely have impairments in learning, storage, free recall,
and/or recognition of verbal information. NAB Judgment performance is associated with deficits
in problem-solving or poor knowledge of home or health safety issues. NAB Driving difficulty
may indicate issues with visuospatial working memory, visual scanning, and attention (Stern &
White, 2003). These cognitive abilities are also associated with the inability to update new
information about the self according to the CAM model (Morris & Mograbi, 2013), which may
explain why poor performers on these tasks also had the worst Online Awareness. To relate these
findings to the hypothesis that executive functioning and memory would be related to online
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awareness, perhaps cognitive deficits, as shown by poor performance on those specific NAB
tasks, contribute to an inability to predict or evaluate performance on the task.
In an attempt to test the hypothesis that apathy, executive functioning, and memory
would be associated with online awareness, differences in the predictor variables between those
who were most aware and least aware were explored. Those with the best Online Awareness
tended to perform better on executive functioning and memory predictor variables, as well as
having overall lower clinician-rated Apathy. While these analyses do not control for other factors
and do not establish the independent contributions of these variables, these analyses do provide
some support for the hypothesis that Apathy, Executive Functioning, and Memory are associated
with Online Awareness in HD.
Another explanation is that people have difficulty assessing their own abilities in general.
People tend to overestimate or are highly optimistic about their abilities. Research has shown
that people tend to estimate their abilities as “above average” (Lovallo & Kahneman, 2003;
Dunning, Heath & Suls, 2004). This is statically impossible, in that there is variation in ability
among the population. In examining these results, this should be taken into consideration, as
regression effects would make it so people who are the best performers would almost always
underestimate their performance while the worst performers would almost always overestimation
their performance and that those who are further away from the mean would be more discrepant.
There does appear to be a difference, however, in discrepancies between ratings between best
and worst performers, suggesting that the top performers were more accurate in their ratings than
bottom performers.
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Online Awareness and Relationships with Disease Progression and Demographic
Characteristics
Motor Scores. Motor scores were not associated with Online Awareness variables.
Education. There was no relationship between education and Online Awareness
variables.
Age. Age was positively associated with Anticipatory Awareness of Recognition
Memory and Delayed Memory evaluation suggesting that the older people were more accurate in
their predictions and evaluations of memory. One explanation may be stereotypes of the
relationship between cognition and age. Furthermore, it is notable that younger age of symptom
onset in HD is associated with a more rapid onset of symptoms (Foroud, Gray, Ivashina, &
Conneally, 1999) (Walker, 2007). According to the Toglia and Kirk model, culture and context
can influence online awareness (Toglia & Kirk, 2000). Studies have shown that individuals have
beliefs that their own memory will decline as they age (Clare, 2002; Levy, 2003; Ryan & See,
1993).

Online Awareness Conclusions
Overall, HD patients tend to overestimate their performance on Executive Functioning
and Memory tasks, especially those who perform the poorest on these tasks. There is also some
evidence that as a group, patients are better at predicting and evaluating memory performance
than executive functioning, which is similar to findings that Metacognitive Knowledge for
memory is better than executive functioning. This suggests that awareness in HD is governed by
local monitoring systems rather than a single metacognitive mechanism. When comparing those
with the best Online Awareness to those with the worst, those with the smallest discrepancies
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between performance and ratings also performed the best on measures of Memory, Executive
Functioning, and had the lowest Apathy, supporting the hypothesis that these factors are related
to Online Awareness and is consistent with past research that indicates apathy, executive
functioning, and memory are important cognitive contributors to awareness.

Psychological Explanations for the Results
Another explanation for the results is that HD patients are experiencing denial and not
anosognosia. Prigatano (2014) proposed that with true unawareness, there is a lack of selfperceived issues, while with true denial, there is an unrealistic perception of self. Both of these
processes can co-occur. Some suggest that denial can be distinguished from anosognosia in the
emotional reaction that is displayed by the person following feedback of their performance or
functioning. A negative reaction is associated with denial, while a perplexed reaction is related to
anosognosia. It is also suggested that avoidance is a coping behavior associated with denial
(Kortte, Wegener, & Chwalisz, 2003; Toglia & Kirk, 2000). In this study, participants were not
provided feedback of results, so it may be difficult to determine which aspects of these results
are related to denial versus anosognosia. Denial and/or unawareness may also occur for family
members for similar reasons (Clare, 2002), which is important to consider given that informant
report was used to measure Metacognitive Knowledge.
Psychological factors may also promote unawareness as a protective strategy to enhance
well-being, particularly when there is a perception of loss of control or independence (Clare,
2002). Therefore, there may be some positive aspect of being unaware of symptoms. Social
psychology research suggests that healthy individuals selectively attend to information that
confirms their biases and expectations. This especially occurs when a person becomes ill or
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disabled or when a person is exposed to disconfirming feedback of his or her concept of self
because the self-concept is under threat with the onset of illness. Therefore, minimizing can be
used as a strategy to cope (Clare, 2002). In fact, several studies suggest that anosognosia is
inversely related to depression, suggesting anosognosia may provide some protection against low
mood (Conde-Sala et al., 2013; Kashiwa et al., 2005).
Furthermore, Toglia & Kirk (2000) suggested that errors are more difficult to recognize
when the task is more highly valued and more related to self-identity. For example, for patients
with traumatic brain injury, performance related to IADLs is frequently overestimated, which
may be because these tasks are associated with personal control (Toglia & Kirk, 2000). The
NAB Judgment task can be seen as a representation of independence since it asks patients safety
related questions. If the patient demonstrates that he or she has a deficient knowledge of being
safe, his or her independence may be threatened. While not an actual driving task, the NAB
Driving task may be in a similar category because driving also represents independence. In fact,
epidemiologic studies suggest that driving cessation in older adults is associated with increased
depression (Breen, Breen, Moore, Breen, & O Neill, 2007; Ragland, Satariano, & MacLeod,
2005). Since independence is valued by individuals in general (Ball et al., 2004) it may be more
difficult for the patients to detect or admit to errors in these tasks.

Study Limitations and Future Directions

Relationships between Metacognitive Knowledge and Online Awareness
Toglia and Kirk (2000) described the relationship between Metacognitive Knowledge and
Online Awareness as a dynamic process, whereby each type of awareness can influence the
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other. This is consistent with the idea that individuals use a “top-down” approach when
estimating performance. That is, individuals begin with an overall belief of their skill and then
use the belief to estimate how they will do on the specific task (Dunning et al., 2003). For
example, individuals may be unaware of their symptoms when they are questioned about them,
but are aware when faced with a task and confronted by their disability (Hannesdottir & Morris,
2007; Moro, Scandola, Bulgarelli, Avesani, & Fotopoulou, 2014). This suggests that one type of
awareness may be intact, while the other is not. Further research could examine the relationship
between Metacognitive Knowledge and Online Awareness in HD.

Addressing Denial versus Anosognosia
Future studies should include a survey asking patients why they selected the rating that
they did to gain a better understanding of their ratings. For example, it was not explored if the
participant truly thought he or she did well on the task or if there was there some fear of
consequences of doing poorly on the tasks. Future studies may provide feedback and code how
patients react to determine if they are experiencing denial or true unawareness.

Use of a Comparison Group
Control Group. This study did not use control participants so it may be difficult to
determine whether or not people, in general, have a difficult time predicting and evaluating
performance. Some suggest that even healthy individuals have difficulty predicting and
evaluating performance (Furnham, 2001), so including controls may help to understand if there
are relative differences in awareness compared to HD. While this may raise the question if
anosognosia is pathological, it does seem that it can be particularly detrimental in
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neurodegenerative populations like HD given possible safety concerns that may arise due to
overestimation of abilities.
Alzheimer’s Disease. It may also be worthwhile to complete this study comparing
Huntington’s disease with Alzheimer’s disease patients, given that memory is impaired while
executive functioning is relatively spared in AD. It would be interesting to see if differences in
anosognosia emerged when directly comparing these populations. For example, AD patients may
show more mnemonic anosognosia than the HD patients. This could demonstrate how deficits in
different cognitive functions may cause anosognosia to develop in specific domains.

Additional Factors
There are many other factors that may be associated with awareness in Huntington’s
disease, such as personality and other psychiatric factors (e.g. anxiety, depression). Future
research may investigate these factors in relationship to unawareness in this population.
Additionally, including different cognitive tasks in domains not theorized to be related to
awareness, such as in language or visuospatial abilities, may be used to demonstrate that memory
and executive dysfunction are specifically related to awareness and not overall cognition decline.
Forty-eight percent of the sample was on anti-chorea/antipsychotic medications to
manage chorea. These medications affect the dopamine system, which may influence the
expression of frontally-mediated behaviors such as apathy and executive dysfunction or even the
expression of awareness (Hergert (Blinkoff) et al., 2015). It may be beneficial to examine results
with a sample of patients who are not taking medications for chorea.
Recent work suggests that despite overestimations in ratings, the most unskilled also are
least confident in their ratings (Miller & Geraci, 2011). While confidence in ratings was not
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explored in this study, the technique has been used in AD. In one study, those rated were rated as
unaware did not change confidence ratings when given the chance to rate performance
retrospectively (Cosentino et al., 2016). Confidence in rating is another way of examining
awareness and may be further explored in future studies.

Methods Limitations
Statistical Power. While regression was intended to best test the hypotheses, given the
rarity of HD, a larger number of HD patient and informant pairs could not be recruited. Some
effects may be small and a larger sample may have been necessary to detect those effects. All
eligible patients who were in the USF HD Registry, which includes patients who live in the
entire state of Florida, were approached to participate. Perhaps a multisite study across states
would be necessary to achieve the numbers needed for sufficient power to detect what could be
small effects in a multivariate regression framework.
Patient Past Exposure to Neuropsychological Testing. Many of the patients have been
exposed to neuropsychological testing, especially since a large portion of the patients in this
study was recruited from other research studies. While the NAB is not part of the UHDRS test
battery typically used in HD studies, perhaps being exposed to neuropsychological tasks may
skew the results of the performance prediction and evaluation portion of the study if the patients
have gotten feedback on their performance on similar testing in the past.
The AES-C. There were several issues with the use of the AES-C as a measure of
clinician-rated Apathy. The intent was to have a more objective measure of Apathy to serve as a
predictor variable. As outlined in the introduction, clinician-rated scales are not completely
unbiased. Also, clinicians are only seeing the patient at one point in time, so they may not get an
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overall view of the person’s actual functioning on a daily basis. The AES-C was based on the
patients’ behaviors and responses, so scores may be more reflective of the patient’s perception of
Apathy. Coding of the patients’ responses was also challenging in that they often provided
yes/no answers even with prompts or just used the rating terms used by the questionnaire (e.g.
slightly characteristic, somewhat characteristic).
The administrator of the AES-C was also not blinded to the study’s hypotheses. The
AES-C requires at least a bachelor’s level clinician. It is suggested that this clinician has at least
two years experience within psychological clinical settings (Clarke et al., 2007). The primary
experimenter was the only study staff member who met these requirements and was available
when each participant’s study session occurred. This could lead to potential bias in the results of
this measure and there should be some caution in interpreting the results of this measure.
However, this is a preliminary study and results may represent at least a proof of concept that can
be replicated in a study with more staff available.
There were no relationships between the AES-C and outcome variables in simple
correlational analyses, however, several relationships emerged with the AES-C variable within
the regression analyses, indicating there may be a suppressor effect with this variable.
Suppressor effects occur when a predictor has a significant effect in a regression, only when
another variable is included and is held constant (Field, 2009). Therefore, results related to the
AES-C should be interpreted cautiously in the regression analyses, as these effects may emerge
from small sample sizes or being included with other predictors that are highly correlated
(Thompson & Levine, 1997).
EMQ-R. There were no norms for the Everyday Memory Questionnaire – Revised for
patients or informants so raw scores were used.
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Executive Functioning Tests. The TMT and Unstructured task are written tests. Studies
have shown a strong motor component for the TMT (Kortte, Horner, & Windham, 2002).
Performance on these tasks may have been influenced by motor and processing speed in addition
to possible executive function contribution. In future studies in HD, it would be important to
consider the use other executive tasks that do not rely on motor functioning. Some examples
include the Iowa Gambling Task, a test of decision-making or the Stockings of Cambridge task,
a test of planning that has been suggested for use in HD clinical studies (Lezak et al., 2012; Stout
et al., 2014).

Conclusions
This research has a number of contributions and implications. This research provides
insight into the possible contributors of unawareness in HD. It may also contribute to the
development of a model of anosognosia for basal ganglia dysfunction. The study also provides
support for using performance prediction and evaluation paradigms in HD for use in future
studies. Executive Functioning, particularly inhibition and self-monitoring, appears to be related
to Metacognitive Knowledge in HD, however, the study also provides some preliminary
evidence that Apathy is also associated with Metacognitive Knowledge. The study also provided
some evidence for an association between Online Awareness and Executive Functioning,
Memory, and Apathy. Also, as a group, HD patients tend to overestimate their performance on
tasks associated with daily functioning. This can have important safety implications for patient
functioning in day-to-day life. For both Metacognitive Knowledge and Online Awareness, HD
patients tended to have a better awareness of memory compared with executive functioning and
apathy, suggesting awareness may be domain specific in this population and may be related to

!

99

the fact that HD patients tend to have significant executive dysfunction and apathy with
relatively intact memory. Those with the most severe symptoms across domains, however,
tended to be most unaware, while those with less severe symptoms tended to be more aware of
their functioning. Because of this, clinicians should be aware that when gathering information, it
is important to get perspective from the patient, as patients may have accurate information about
themselves, particularly for those who are earlier in the disease progression. In contrast, it may
be important to gather additional information independent of the patient’s report for those whose
disease is more advanced.
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APPENDIX A:
PROCEDURE INFORMATION
Performance Prediction and Evaluation Scripts and Bell Curve
“In a few moments we will start to do some tasks looking at your thinking abilities. I would like
to know how well you think you will do on the task compared to other people similar to you. I
want you to imagine that we gave the same task to 100 healthy people of the same gender,
similar age and with similar levels of education (So imagine 100 men or women [depending on
their gender] that are your age and has the same level of education WITHOUT HD). Imagine
that we then lined them up, based on their scores from best (or highest) to lowest (or worst)
[Show them the bell curve]. If we look at a group of 100 people, we see that very few people do
really poorly [point to the low end of the graph], and very few people do extremely well [point to
the high end of the graph], and most people fall here around the 50th percentile. Ask if the
participant has questions. These instructions can be repeated as much as necessary.
Additionally, at some points during the testing, I’m going to stop and ask you to tell me how you
think you did on the test. When I ask you how you did, I’d like you to tell me how well you think
you did on the test compared to other people similar to you.” Ask if the participant has
questions. These instructions can be repeated as much as necessary.
The participant is then presented with the instructions as indicated by standard NAB test
protocol. Before beginning the task, participants will be asked “Please tell me how you think you
will perform on this task compared to healthy people like you: below average, average, or above
average?” Record the participant’s response. Afterwards say, “Ok here the is the graph we
looked at earlier [present bell curve]. Please point out where you would be on this graph.”
After the task was completed say, “Please tell me if you think you performed below average,
average, or above average.” Record the participant’s response. Afterwards say, “Ok here the is
the graph we looked at earlier [present bell curve]. Please point out where you would be on this
graph.”
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Table 1A. Order of counterbalanced neuropsychological tasks.
Version 1

Version 2

Version 3

Version 4

1. HVLT-R
Immediate Trials
2. Stroop
3. TMT
4. NAB Judgment
5. NAB Driving
6. HVLT-R Delay
7. NAB Everyday
Memory Immediate
8. Unstructured
Task
9. NAB Everyday
Memory Delay

1. HVLT-R
Immediate Trials
2. Stroop
3. TMT
5. NAB Driving
6. NAB Judgment
6. HVLT-R Delay
7. NAB Everyday
Memory
Immediate
8. Unstructured
Task
9. Everyday
Memory Delay

1. NAB Everyday
Memory Immediate
2. Unstructured
Task
3. Everyday
Memory Delay
4. HVLT-R
Immediate Trials
5. Stroop
6. TMT
7. NAB Driving
8. NAB Judgment
9. HVLT-R Delay

1. NAB Everyday
Memory Immediate
2. Unstructured Task
3. Everyday Memory
Delay
4. HVLT-R
Immediate Trials
5. Stroop
6. TMT
7. NAB Judgment
8. NAB Driving
9. HVLT-R Delay
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APPENDIX B:
INFORMANT DEMOGRAPHICS QUESTIONNAIRE
Subject #: ____________________

Years of Education: ______________

Age: ________

Gender: _____________

Ethnicity (circle one):
Hispanic/Latino Non-Hispanic or Latino

Ethnicity Unknown/Prefer not to answer

Race (circle one or more):
African-American/Black

Asian

American Indian/ Alaskan Native

Native Hawaiian/Pacific Islander

White

Race Unknown/Prefer not to answer

What is your relation to the patient? __________________________

How well do you know the patient? (Circle one)
Hardly At All

Not So Well

Fairly Well

Pretty Well

How long have you known the patient? ___________________
What is your HD status? (Circle one)
Not at risk (no family history, unrelated to the patient)
At Risk (Family history, but have not had the gene test)
Gene Positive (had the gene test, but do not have symptoms of HD)
Gene Negative (had the gene test and do not have the HD gene)
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Very Well

APPENDIX C:
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS

Table 2A. Patient Disease Characteristics: Main Variables of interest are bolded and have
skewness and kurtosis listed.
N
MoCA Raw
MoCA z
UHDRS
Motor Score
Age Motor
Sx Onset

56
56
56

Sample’s
Score Range
9 - 28
-3.86-1.22
3-65

Mean

SD

20.24
1.22
29.98

5.09
-.82
16.77

52

23-63

44.88

10.51

Age of
Diagnosis
CAG Repeat
Larger Allele
CAP Score
Chorea
Medications:
None
Risperidone
Xenazine
Haldol
Olazapine
Orap

51

24-65

47.45

9.96

44

40-57

43.5

2.88

44

308.28-770.22 494.87

88.75

Skewness

Kurtosis

.245(.319)

-1.01 (.63)

.549 (.36)

1.332 (.71)

N
29
19
1
1
4
2

*Indicates a significant deviation from normal at p<.05; Variables used in main analyses are
bolded
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Table 3A. Descriptive Statistics of Predictor Variables Neuropsychological Measures & Apathy
for the Sample.
N
Apathy Evaluation
Scale Total Score
HVLT-R:
Immediate Total Raw
Immediate Total T-score

56

Score
Range
20-66

56
56

3-28
20-49

14.98
25.89

5.97
8.71

Delay Raw
Delay T-score

56
56

0-11
20-55

3.9
27.27

3.36
10.54

Recognition Raw
Recognition T-score

56
56

-1 – 11
20-52

7.16
31.21

3.11
12.44

Percent Retention Raw
56
Percent Retention T-score 56
Trail Making Test:
Trails A Time Raw
53
Trails A T score

0-117%
20-65

56.18
34.79

38.83
16.25

18-180 sec 59.28
4-64
31.7

34.01
14.79

Trails B Time Raw
Trails B T score

36-300 sec 159.73 83.83
4-69
29.77 14.79

53
53

Mean

SD

Skewness

Kurtosis

44.73

11.4

-.399 (.32)

-.56 (.63)

-.52 (.319) -.63 (.63)
.485 (.319) -1.5 (.63)*

Trails B/A adjusted
56
-6.1-1.52
-.99
1.82
-1 (.32)*
.732(.628)
score
TMT-B-A adj score
56
-15.9-1.51 -4.18
4.22
Stroop Test:
Color-Word Raw
55
0-52
22.13 11.2
Color-Word T score
55
15-60
33.66 9.76
Interference T score
56
31-64
48.9
6.02
.002 (.319) .5 (.628)
Unstructured Task:
# High Value Completed 54
0-9
3.56
1.89
# Low Value Completed 54
0-6
2
1.45
# High Value Attempted 54
0-3
.57
.77
# Low Value Attempted 54
0-2
.74
.71
Total Points Earned
54
5-450
197.44 104.96 -.03 (.325) -.8 (.639)
Total Points Standard
56
-2.61-.67
-1.3
.75
.269 (.319) -.65(.629)
Score (Imputed)
*Indicates a significant deviation from normal at p<.05; Variables used in main analyses are
bolded
Table 4A. Descriptive Statistics of Main Variables – Metacognitive Knowledge Variables.
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N

Score Range

Mean

SD

Everyday Memory:
Patient Report

56

0-52

24.26
20.7

15.74
13.96

Informant Report

50

0-50
3.46

2.72

Discrepancy
Apathy:
Patient Report

50

-46-33

56

30-120 (T)

72.75

19.74

Informant Report

50

44-136

87.96

19.36

Discrepancy

49

-56-30

-16.1

2.99

Executive
Dysfunction:
Patient Report

56

37-119 (T)

75.45

17.32

Informant Report

50

44-112

75.67

15.99

Skewness

Kurtosis

-.53 (.337)

-.44 (.662)

-.022(.337) -.624(.662)

Discrepancy
49
-47-32
-1.9
2.75
-.633 (.33) -.394(.662)
*Indicates a significant deviation from normal at p<.05; Variables used in main analyses are
bolded
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Table 5A. Descriptive Statistics of Main Variables – Performance Prediction Evaluation
Variables
N
55
55

Score Range
9-19
1-95%ile

Mean
13.75
34.58

SD
2.49
28.95

Skewness

Kurtosis

55
54

-91-57
-91-56

-16.92
-11.21

32.39
23.18

.136 (.322)
-.096 (.325)

-.45 (.634)
-.41(.639)

54
54
54

14-54
1-55
-84-22

33.46
10.11
-29.37

9.73
13.67
26.88

.244(.325)

-.829(.639)

54

-94-13

-35.76

23.18

-.099(.325)

.004(.639)

3-26
1-75%ile

17.73
15.6

5.85
17.66

Delay Raw
%ile

0-9
1-75

5.42
13.36

2.67
17.29

Recognition
%ile
Address:
Total
%ile

0-2
1-75

.67
14.2

.72
17.95

2-22
1-50

13.47
15.8

4.89
21.26

0-8
1-75

3.18
14.16

2.55
19.15

Judgment Raw
Judgment %ile
Prediction
Discrepancy
Evaluation
Discrepancy
Driving Raw
Driving %ile
Prediction
Discrepancy
Evaluation
Discrepancy
Medication:
Immediate Raw
%ile

Delay
%ile

55

55

Recognition
1-8
6
1.78
%ile
1-75
14.2
17.95
*Indicates a significant deviation from normal at p<.05; Variables used in main analyses are
bolded
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APPENDIX D:
GENERAL DATA DIAGNOSTICS

Missing Data
All data were inspected for missing data points. Two participants did not complete the
Unstructured Task and Trail Making Tests because they had difficulty writing due to problematic
movements. One participant did not complete the Unstructured Task due to time limitations. One
participant had some problems with vision and had difficulty completing the Trail Making and
Stroop Tests. One participant is missing the NAB Driving task total score and evaluation score
because the correct stimulus book was unavailable. That same participant person was missing
delayed address memory prediction scores due to examiner error. One participant did not
complete the performance prediction/evaluation part of the study because of time limitations.
One participant is missing informant FrSBe scores due to informant error in completing the
form. Forty-four participants had CAG genetic reports available. The rest of the participants (12)
were diagnosed with HD based on a family history of HD and confirmation by neurologic exam.
Data imputation was considered to maximize the number of participants included in the
analysis. Little’s MCAR (Missing Completely at Random) test was conducted for the following
variables: TMT-A and TMT-B total time and standard score, Unstructured Task total points, and
Stroop Word, Color, Color-Word Time and Standard score as well as Stroop Interference, and
the NAB driving total score and performance evaluation. Results of the analysis were non-
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significant, χ2 (24)=22.728, p=.536, indicating that missing data is missing completely at
random. Multiple imputation is appropriate. Five iterations were created with the MI approach in
MPLUS. These data iterations were averaged and then the data was added to the original dataset.

Variable Conversions and Calculations
For questionnaires and cognitive tests where normative data was available, raw scores
were converted to standard scores. Table 15 indicates the normative corrections available for
each measure (only measures with normative data are listed).

Table 6A. Normative data available for each measure.
Age

Gender

FrSBe

X

X

HVLT-R

X

TMT

X

Stroop

X

NAB Tasks

X

Unstructured
Task

X

X

Race/Ethnicity

Education
X

X

X
X

X

X

Examining Normality and Outliers
Descriptive statistics and skewness and kurtosis were then calculated for all predictor and
dependent variables. Data histograms for each variable were visually inspected to assess
normality and to detect outliers. Additionally, guidelines by Field (2009) were used to determine
deviations from normality by transforming skewness and kurtosis values for each variable into z!
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scores. Any z-score of an absolute value greater than 1.96, was deemed as a significant deviation
from a kurtosis and skewness of 0 (p<.05), therefore indicating a violation of normality (see
Table X in Appendix A). Because the HVLT – R Recognition standard score deviated
significantly from normality because most patient’s standard scores were at floor (T<20), the
HVLT-R Recognition Raw scores were used instead as these scores are distributed normally, and
also seem to better capture the range of the participants’ recognition memory abilities.
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APPENDIX E:
ADDITIONAL ANALYSES FOR METACOGNITIVE KNOWLEDGE

Correlations among Primary Predictors (“Objective” Measures) and Outcome Variables
Correlational analyses between the Metacognitive Knowledge discrepancy scores and the
proposed main predictor variables (Unstructured Task Total Points standard score, TMT B/A
Ratio Score, Stroop Interference score, AES-C total score, and the HVLT-R Recognition) were
examined. Forty-eight participants were included in this analysis (2 were excluded because they
were found to be influential data points in the main multivariate regression analysis, therefore the
same participants were included in this analysis for consistency). Negative agreement scores
indicate that the informant provided more severe ratings than the patient provided. The Apathy
discrepancy score was related to the Unstructured Task Total Points, r=.366, p<.01 and the
Stroop Interference score r=.383, p<.01. The Executive Dysfunction discrepancy score was
related to the Stroop Interference Score r=.303, p<.05 (See Figures 1A, 2A, and 3A). There
were no other relationships with Apathy or Executive Dysfunction discrepancy scores. Memory
discrepancy scores were unrelated to any predictor variable.
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Table 7A. Correlations between main predictors and outcome variables for Metacognitive
Knowledge.
Unstructured Stroop
AES-C
Task Points Interference
ns
ns
ns

Memory
Discrepancy
Apathy
.366**
.383**
Discrepancy
EF
ns
.303*
Discrepancy
ns=not significant, ** p<.01, * p<.05

HVLT-R
ns

ns

ns

ns

ns

Figure 1A. Relationship between Metacognitive Knowledge of Apathy and Unstructured Task
Performance.
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Figure 2A. Relationship between Metacognitive Knowledge of Apathy and Stroop Interference
Scores.

Figure 3A. Relationship Metacognitive Knowledge of Executive Functioning and Stroop
Interference.
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Correlations of Other HVLT-R Memory Indices with Outcome Variables (MCK)
Exploratory analyses were also conducted to determine if different aspects of memory
were associated with Metacognitive Knowledge. Analysis of all components of the HVLT-R was
used to explore which aspects of memory may be associated with anosognosia in HD. The
HVLT-R has been used in prodromal HD patients to measure learning and encoding using Trial
1 and Total Score, Retrieval using Delayed Recall Score and Storage using the Discriminability
and Retention score (Solomon et al., 2007). Apathy discrepancy was related to the HVLT-R
Trial 1, r=.392, p<.01 and HVLT-R Immediate Memory Total Standard Score, r=.342, p<.05.
There was a trending relationship between Apathy discrepancy and HVLT-R Delay Raw Score,
r=.24, p=.097. There were no relationships between other HVLT-R sub-scores and Executive
Dysfunction or memory discrepancy scores.

Table 8A. Relationships between Metacognitive Knowledge and Memory.
Trial 1

Total Score

Delayed
Recall

Discriminability

Apathy
Discrepancy

.392**

.342*

.24+

ns

Executive
Functioning
Discrepancy

ns

ns

ns

ns

ns

ns

Memory
ns
ns
Discrepancy
ns=not significant, + trending, ** p<.01, *p<.05
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Correlations of Other Executive Measures with Outcome Variables (MCK)
To examine if different aspects of executive function are associated with Metacognitive
Knowledge, correlations between the MCK outcome variables and each executive task was
examined. Apathy discrepancy scores were related to the Stroop CW, Stroop Interference, and
the Unstructured Task Total Points. Executive Dysfunction discrepancy scores were related to
the Stroop Interference score (See Table 18).

Table 9A. Correlations between Executive Measures and Metacognitive Knowledge.
TMT-B

TMT-B-A

Memory
ns
ns
Discrepancy
Apathy
ns
ns
Discrepancy
EF
ns
ns
Discrepancy
ns= not significant; * p<.05; ** p<.01

Stroop CW
ns

Stroop
Interference
ns

Unstructured Task
Total Points
ns

.295*

.383**

.366**

ns

.303*

ns

Correlations of Other Factors and Outcome Variables (MCK)
In addition to hypothesized variables, there are several other non-cognitive or emotion
related variables that were considered that either may be related to awareness or could explain
results (See Table 19).
Regarding gender’s relationship with Apathy discrepancy scores, the mean male
discrepancy score (M=-25, SD=17.55) was higher than the mean female discrepancy score (M=11, SD=21.93). While not a control variable, the Apathy discrepancy scores were also related to
the standardized MoCA score, r=.399, p<.01.
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Table 10A. Relationships among Metacognitive Knowledge variables and control variables.
Apathy Discrepancy
Age
ns
Gender
-.315*
Motor Scores
-.34*
Education
ns
Caregiver Burden -.276, p=.055
ns= not significant; * p<.05; ** p<.01

Executive Discrepancy
-.381**
ns
-.287*
ns
ns

Memory Discrepancy
-.294*
ns
ns
ns
ns

Table 11A. Metacognitive Knowledge Model without Motor Scores.
R2
Model 1:
Without
Motor
Scores
.409

R2 Model
2: With
Motor
Scores

R2 Δ

F Value for R2
Δ

Overall Significance
for OLS Model

.411

.002

F(1,38)=.11,
p=.742

No Motor:
F(8,39)=3.376, p<.01
Motor:
F(9,38)=2.945, p<.01

EF
Discrepancy

.328

.326

.002

F(1,38)=.125,
p=.726

Memory
Discrepancy

.285

.286

.01

F(1,38)=.003,
p=.954

No Motor:
F(8,39)=2.358, p<.05
Motor:
F(9,38)=2.063,
p<.058
No Motor:
F(8, 39)=1.948,
p=.08
Motor
F(9,38)=1.541,
p=.126

OLS Model

Apathy
Discrepancy

Model Fit: χ2 (24)=52.317, p<.001.

The model without motor scores also did not deviate from multivariate normality,
B1p=0.79, X2(10)=7.11, p=0.71, B2p=13.48, zupper=-0.97 zlower=-1.73 (See Table 21 and Figure 28
for results).
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Apathy Awareness
In the model excluding motor scores, Apathy Discrepancy scores were related the Stroop
Interference score (positive relationship) and the Unstructured Task total score (positive
relationship). There was a trending relationship with the AES-C total score (positive
relationship). The Wald test suggests that the coefficients for the AES-C and Stroop interference
scores are not significantly different χ2 (1)=1.038, p=0.31. The AES-C and Unstructured
coefficients were also not significantly different χ2(1)=0.496, p=0.48. The Unstructured Task
and Stroop coefficients were not significantly different χ2(1)=0.159, p=0.68.

Executive Functioning
With motor scores excluded, the Executive Dysfunction Discrepancy scores were related
to the HVLT-R recognition score (negative relationship) and the Unstructured Task Norms
(positive relationship). The coefficients were significantly different χ2(1)=8.682, p<.05.

Memory
The Memory Discrepancy score was negatively related to the HVLT-R recognition score.
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Table 12A. Metacognitive Analysis without Motor Scores (48 participants).
Apathy Awareness

Executive Awareness

Memory Awareness

Est.

SE

St. Est

Est.

SE

St. Est

Est.

SE

St. Est.

Uns. Task

0.399*

0.170

0.314*

0.478*

0.185

0.369*

0.117

0.198

0.087

Stroop Int.

0.508*

0.208

0.330*

0.161

0.227

0.102

0.032

0.242

0.020

AES-C

0.254+

0.130

0.259+

0.219

0.142

0.219

0.104

0.152

0.100

HVLT-R

-0.202

0.130

-0.215

-0.329*

0.142

-0.343*

-0.361*

0.152

-0.362*

Age

-0.003

0.012

-0.036

-0.025*

0.013

-0.284*

-0.025+

0.013

0.167+

Gender

-0.531*

0.254

-0.271*

0.087

0.276

0.044

0.015

0.296

0.007

Education

0.056

0.054

0.129

0.001

0.058

0.001

0.077

0.063

0.167

Care Burden

-0.253+

0.136

-0.263+

-0.291*

0.148

-0.296*

-0.407*

0.159

-0.398*

Main Predictors are bolded; * p<.05; + p<.1; Uns. Task = Unstructured Task Total Points
Standard Score; Stroop Int.=Stroop Interference Scores; HVLT-R=HVLT-R Recognition Scores;
Care Burden= Caregiver Burden
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Figure 4A. Multivariate Multiple Regression Results (no motor scores included).
Black indicates a significant path, Blue indicates a non-significant path. Standardized
coefficients are reported in the figures.
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APPENDIX F:
ADDITIONAL ANALYSES FOR ANTICIPATORY AWARENESS

Correlations between Predictors and Anticipatory Awareness Variables
With the removal of the influential data points from the final regression model (51
participants), only the AES-C was trending with immediate medication memory r=.284, p<.05.
Correlations between Additional Variables and Anticipatory Awareness Dependent
Variables
With the removal of influential data points, age was associated with address recognition
memory, r=.479, p<.001.
Creating Prediction Discrepancy Factor Scores
The intended analysis was to use a principal components analysis approach to create the
overall Memory Prediction and Executive Function Prediction factor scores from each NAB
task’s prediction – performance discrepancy score. The purpose was to reduce the number of
variables in the main regression analysis. Assumptions were met for the creation of a PCA factor
score for executive function prediction; the judgment and driving prediction discrepancy scores
were significantly associated r=.559, p<.001. The KMO suggested adequate sampling (.5) and
Bartlett’s test of sphericity was significant χ2(1)=7.039, p<.01. However, the relationships
among some memory discrepancy scores were not significant, therefore one factor score could
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not be created for “memory prediction.” It may also be more beneficial theoretically to examine
these components of memory separately as they are typically associated with different processes
(e.g. immediate memory – encoding, delay memory-retrieval, and recognition memory),
therefore the creation of factors for these variables was explored. There were significant
relationships between immediate memory for medication and address (r=.495, p<.001), between
the delay memory for medication and address (r=.535, p<.001), and between recognition
memory for medication and address (r=.384, p<.01). There was also adequate sampling
(KMO=.5) and Bartlett’s test of sphericity indicated PCA was appropriate for these variable pairs
χ2 (1)=14.78, p<.001 (immediate memory), χ2 (1)=17.38, p<.001 (delayed memory), and χ2
(1)=8.31, p<.01 (recognition memory). The created factors scores histograms were examined for
normality. All factor scores had a normal distribution.
There was only a trending relationship between the executive factor predictor score and
HVLT-R recognition raw scores, r=.232, p=.091. The factor prediction scores were unrelated to
any other predictor variable. Relationships were also examined between the factor scores and the
control variables (age, gender, education, and motor scores). Age was associated with memory
recognition prediction, r=.338, p <.05. There was a trending relationship between motor scores
and delayed memory, r=-.243, p=.077.
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Table 13A. Correlations between main predictors and outcome variables for Anticipatory
Awareness.
Anticipatory AES-C
Awareness:

Stroop
Interference

Unstructured
Task

HVLT-R
Recognition

Executive
Factor

ns

ns

ns

.232, p=.091

Immediate
Memory
Factor

ns

ns

ns

ns

Delayed
Memory
Factor
Recognition
Memory
Factor

ns

ns

ns

ns

ns

ns

ns

ns
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APPENDIX G:
ADDITIONAL ANALYSES FOR EMERGENT AWARENESS

Correlations between Predictors and Emergent Awareness Variables
Performance Evaluation scores were calculated by subtracting the patient ratings from the
actual performance percentile for each NAB task and/or subtask. AES-C was related to
medication immediate memory, r=.294, p<.05. Age was associated with medication delay
memory evaluation, r=.302, p<.05 and address delay memory evaluation, r=.348, p<.05. No
other relationships were detected.

Creating Evaluation Discrepancy Factor Scores
Assumptions were met for the creation of a PCA factor score for executive function
evaluation; the judgment evaluation and driving evaluation scores were significantly associated
r=.622, p<.001. The KMO suggested adequate sampling (.5) and Bartlett’s test of sphericity
indicated was significant X2(1)=25.194, p<.001. Factor scores were also created for immediate
memory evaluation (medication and address relationship, r=.701, p<.001), delay memory
evaluation (relationship r=.609, p<.001), recognition memory (relationship r=.417, p<.01).
There was also adequate sampling (KMO=.5) and Bartlett’s test of sphericity indicated
PCA was appropriate for these variable pairs X2(1)=35.54, p<.001 (immediate memory),
X2(1)=23.9, p<.001 (delayed memory), and X2(1)=10.02, p<.01 (recognition memory). The
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created factors scores histograms were examined for normality. All factor scores had a normal
distribution. The only relationship present between factor scores and main predictors was the
AES-C and the Recognition Memory score (r=.285, p<.05).

Table 14A. Correlations between main predictors and outcome variables for Emergent
Awareness.
Emergent
Awareness:
Executive
Factor
Immediate
Memory
Factor
Delayed
Memory
Factor
Recognition
Memory
Factor

!

AES-C
ns

Stroop
Interference
ns

Unstructured
Task
ns

HVLT-R
Recognition
ns

ns

ns

ns

ns

ns

ns

ns

ns

.285, p<.05

ns

ns

ns
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APPENDIX H:
Institutional Review Board Approvals

October 26, 2015
Danielle Hergert, M.A. Psychology
4202 E. Fowler Avenue PCD 4118G
Tampa, FL 33620
RE: Expedited Approval for Initial Review
IRB#: Pro00023422
Title: The Independent Contributions of Emotion and Cognitive Dysfunction on Anosognosia in
Huntington’s Disease Patients
Study Approval Period: 10/25/2015 to 10/25/2016
Dear Ms. Hergert:
On 10/25/2015, the Institutional Review Board (IRB) reviewed and APPROVED the above application
and all documents contained within, including those outlined below.
Approved Item(s): Protocol Document(s): Pro00023422_Protocol V1
Consent/Assent Document(s)*:
Informant Consent_V1.pdf Patient Consent_V1.pdf Informant Online V1 **granted a waiver
*Please use only the official IRB stamped informed consent/assent document(s) found under the
"Attachments" tab. Please note, these consent/assent document(s) are only valid during the approval
period indicated at the top of the form(s). **Waivers are not stamped.
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It was the determination of the IRB that your study qualified for expedited review which includes
activities that (1) present no more than minimal risk to human subjects, and (2) involve
only procedures listed in one or more of the categories outlined below. The IRB may review research
through the expedited review procedure authorized by 45CFR46.110 and 21 CFR 56.110. The research
proposed in this study is categorized under the following expedited review category:
(4) Collection of data through noninvasive procedures (not involving general anesthesia or sedation)
routinely employed in clinical practice, excluding procedures involving x-rays or microwaves. Where
medical devices are employed, they must be cleared/approved for marketing.
(5) Research involving materials (data, documents, records, or specimens) that have been collected, or
will be collected solely for nonresearch purposes (such as medical treatment or diagnosis).
(7) Research on individual or group characteristics or behavior (including, but not limited to, research on
perception, cognition, motivation, identity, language, communication, cultural beliefs or practices, and
social behavior) or research employing survey, interview, oral history, focus group, program evaluation,
human factors evaluation, or quality assurance methodologies.
Your study qualifies for a waiver of the requirements for the informed consent process as outlined in the
federal regulations at 45CFR46.116 (d) which states that an IRB may approve a consent procedure which
does not include, or which alters, some or all of the elements of informed consent, or waive the
requirements to obtain informed consent provided the IRB finds and documents that (1) the research
involves no more than minimal risk to the subjects; (2) the waiver or alteration will not adversely affect
the rights and welfare of the subjects; (3) the research could not practicably be carried out without the
waiver or alteration; and (4) whenever appropriate, the subjects will be provided with additional pertinent
information after participation.
Your study qualifies for a waiver of the requirements for the documentation of informed consent as
outlined in the federal regulations at 45CFR46.117(c) which states that an IRB may waive the
requirement for the investigator to obtain a signed consent form for some or all subjects if it finds either:
(1) That the only record linking the subject and the research would be the consent document and the
principal risk would be potential harm resulting from a breach of confidentiality. Each subject will be
asked whether the subject wants documentation linking the subject with the research, and the subject's
wishes will govern; or (2) That the research presents no more than minimal risk of harm to subjects and
involves no procedures for which written consent is normally required outside of the research context.
Your study qualifies for a waiver of the requirement for signed authorization as outlined in the HIPAA
Privacy Rule regulations at 45CFR164.512(i) which states that an IRB may approve a waiver or alteration
of the authorization requirement provided that the following criteria are met (1) the PHI use or disclosure
involves no more than a minimal risk to the privacy of individuals; (2) the research could not practicably
be conducted without the requested waiver or alteration; and (3) the research could not practicably be
conducted without access to and use of the PHI.
[A partial waiver of HIPAA Authorization is granted for recruitment purposes only; Authorization will be
obtained as part of the informed consent process. Pursuant to this partial waiver, the study team is allowed
to access the USF Huntington's Disease Research Registry to obtain PHI of patients who provided their
informed consent to participate in the registry to determine whether they meet inclusion criteria for this
study. ]
As the principal investigator of this study, it is your responsibility to conduct this study in accordance

!

148

with IRB policies and procedures and as approved by the IRB. Any changes to the approved research
must be submitted to the IRB for review and approval via an amendment. Additionally, all unanticipated
problems must be reported to the USF IRB within five (5) calendar days.
We appreciate your dedication to the ethical conduct of human subject research at the University of South
Florida and your continued commitment to human research protections. If you have any questions
regarding this matter, please call 813-974-5638.
Sincerely,

Kristen Salomon, Ph.D., Vice Chairperson
USF Institutional Review Board

9/28/2016
Danielle Hergert, M.A.
Psychology
4202 E. Fowler Avenue Tampa, FL 33620
RE: Expedited Approval for Continuing Review
IRB#: CR1_Pro00023422
Title: The Independent Contributions of Emotion and Cognitive Dysfunction on Anosognosia in
Huntington’s Disease Patients
Study Approval Period: 10/25/2016 to 10/25/2017
Dear Danielle Hergert:
On 9/28/2016, the Institutional Review Board (IRB) reviewed and APPROVED the above application
and all documents contained within including those outlined below.
Approved Item(s): Protocol Document(s):
Pro00023422_Protocol V2_Jan182016_Clean
The waiver of informed consent process, waiver of documentation of consent and the waiver of HIPAA
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for recruitment/screening purposes only authorization have been renewed.
The IRB determined that your study qualified for expedited review based on federal expedited category
number(s):
(4) Collection of data through noninvasive procedures (not involving general anesthesia or sedation)
routinely employed in clinical practice, excluding procedures involving x-rays or microwaves. Where
medical devices are employed, they must be cleared/approved for marketing.
(5) Research involving materials (data, documents, records, or specimens) that have been collected, or
will be collected solely for nonresearch purposes (such as medical treatment or diagnosis).
(7) Research on individual or group characteristics or behavior (including, but not limited to, research on
perception, cognition, motivation, identity, language, communication, cultural beliefs or practices, and
social behavior) or research employing survey, interview, oral history, focus group, program evaluation,
human factors evaluation, or quality assurance methodologies.
As the principal investigator of this study, it is your responsibility to conduct this study in accordance
with USF HRPP policies and procedures and as approved by the USF IRB. Any changes to the approved
research must be submitted to the IRB for review and approval by an amendment. Additionally, all
unanticipated problems must be reported to the USF IRB within five (5) calendar days.
We appreciate your dedication to the ethical conduct of human subject research at the University of South
Florida and your continued commitment to human research protections. If you have any questions
regarding this matter, please call 813-974-5638.
Sincerely,

John Schinka, Ph.D., Chairperson
USF Institutional Review Board
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